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Abstract 
 
This study is primarily devoted to explore and analyse the application of principle of 
proportionality as a method of investment dispute settlement particulary in indirect 
expropriation cases. Recently, ICSID arbitrators gradually attract application of principle 
of  proportionality by citing European Courts of Human Right (ECHR) and its case laws, 
and World Trade Organization (WTO) Jurisprudence. However, there are numerous 
opinion among several scholars on the application of this principle by ICSID tribunals. 
Various tribunals and scholars have accepted that the  host states could enjoy their 
sovereign rights in order to enhance socio-economic condition, protect environment and 
protect essential interest of State during state of emergency/economic crisis through 
adopting various regulatory measures. At the same time host states are under compulsion 
to fulfill their contractual commitments which were given at the entry of investment. This 
situation creates more difficult to the arbitrators to come to a conclusion whether 
regulatory measures amount to indirect taking as these regulatory measures prevent the 
use and enjoyment of investors‘ property rights. Therefore, application of proportionality is 
considered as a desired method of resolving two different conflicts of interest. Thus, this 
research tries to examine how above principle is applied by ICSID tribunals to balance 
different conflicts of interests in the situation of state of necessity. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 General Overview of the Study  
Arbitration is one of the fastest growing areas in international investment dispute settlement 
mechanism
1
. It is based on contractual agreement, which excludes the jurisdiction of domestic 
court
2
. It is usually less costly and more efficient than litigation through regular courts
3
. There 
are a number of investment tribunals such as ICJ, UNCITRAL, Iran-US Claim Tribunal and 
etc. to resolve investment dispute amicably. This research will analyze the role ICSID 
tribunals on the application of principle of proportionality. These tribunals are set up under 
the International Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID Convention)
4
 
and it provides an autonomous regime for submitting investment disputes to arbitration or 
conciliation
5
.  ICSID is part of a World Bank Group and many countries are ratified to it
6
. It is 
considered as most common means of international investment dispute resolution forum 
recognized by the bi-multilateral and regional treaties.    
 
Generally, foreign investment contracts are mostly concluded as long-term cross-border 
investments, as a result, unexpected non commercial risks, politically or legally, may arise 
during the period of its duration
7
. To evade this fear, many bilateral and multilateral treaties 
                                                          
1 Sornarajah (2008)  pp. 249-50,  
2
 Dimsey (2008) p.7 
3
 Schreuer (2009) p. 7 
4
 Supra note 1 at p.. 461 
5
 Lew (2004)  p. 268 
6
 There are currently 155 signatory States to the ICSID Convention. Of these, 144 States have also deposited 
their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of the Convention and have become ICSID 
Contracting States. See, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=ShowHome&pageName=
MemberStates_Home (visited on 12/09/2010) 
7 Dolzer and Schreuer (2008) p.4. They pointed out the risks in long term foreign investment 
contracts and how the foreign investment should be design, “a key feature in the design of such a 
foreign investment is to key out in advance the risks inherent in such long – term relationship, 
both from a business perspective and from the legal point of view, and then to identify a business 
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are concluded with provisions on “no” expropriation without compensation and settlement 
through arbitration. Since, nationalization or expropriation (directly or indirectly) of foreign 
property is the foremost governmental interference on foreign investment, it is considered as 
one of the most serious encroachments on property rights of foreign investor. Dolzer and 
Schreuer (2008) say that “expropriation is the most severe form of interference with 
property”. Further, they continue that “all expectations of the investors are destroyed in case 
the investment is taken without adequate compensation”.  Even though, today States are 
hesitant to expropriate directly, they use a number of indirect expropriation methods which is 
so-called „creeping expropriation or indirect expropriation‟8 or sometimes called general or 
specific governmental measures
9
. Whatever methods employed to take-over foreign asserts, 
ultimately foreign investor has to suffer the total loss, since the property and investor are 
located in the host state
10
 . On the other hand, host states are under the obligation to bring 
many measures in order to enhance socio-economic and environmental development of the 
country. This is called as „regulatory measures‟.  It creates more difficult to the arbitrators to 
come to a conclusion whether regulatory measures amount to indirect taking. In this regard, a 
clear conflict of interest arises between public interest and investors‟ right. Hence, now 
arbitrators gradually put their heads into applying proportionality principle while citing 
European Courts of Human Right (ECHR) and its case laws
11
 as well as World Trade 
Organization (WTO) Jurisprudence for necessity requirements.
12
   
 
Further, “Principle of proportionality” plays a major role to determine the balance between 
two different conflicts of interests namely public interest and individual rights. It is a 
                                                                                                                                                                                
concept an d legal structure that is suitable not only to the implementation of the project in general but 
also to minimize risk that may arise during the period of investment”. 
8
Schreuer states that the direct expropriation has become rare.  Cases involving claims for indirect 
expropriation through regulatory measures are much more prevalent. See 
http://www.univie.ac.at/intlaw/93.pdf;  also see Redfern (2004) Para(s) 11-32 
9
 Schreuer (2009)  p. 113 
10
 Weiler (2005), p. 656, he points out that “it has been generally been considered that indirect expropriation 
is nothing more than unfair treatment that has been caused near total loss in value to the investment in 
question”. 
11
 Stone Sweet (2010) p.15 
12
 Continental Casualty Company v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9) Award September 5, 
2008, available at http://ita.law.uvic.ca/documents/ContinentalCasualtyAward.pdf 
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procedural law rather than substantive law. According to Sweet and Mathews‟ (2008, p75), “it 
is a decision–making procedure and an analytical structure that judges employ to deal with 
tensions between two pleaded constitutional values or interest”. This principle is not a new 
phenomenon in the international law and also it is a wide spread principle in the field of 
human rights and humanitarian law, criminal law and WTO laws. Moreover, application of 
proportionality principle is not left ICSID tribunals as well.  
 
However, many scholars and academics criticize the approach of ICSID Tribunals on 
application of principle of proportionality. Some scholars express that the application of 
principle of proportionality allows judges to see the entire contextual field which enables to 
provide equitable judgment, as it embraces balancing
13
.  Some others like Bruke-White 
criticizes that ICSID tribunals failed to answer for relevant issues in public law questions i.e. 
what are the basic powers of host state?  and to what extent it can enjoy to regulate public 
interest and the state‟s capacity to make basic socio-economic and political choices?14.  These 
questions were not addressed properly by ICSID Tribunals in recent Argentina cases. 
Therefore, this research tries to analyze the concept of proportionality and how ICSID 
tribunals are deserved balancing proportionality to investment disputes settlement.    
 
In addition to this, most of the Argentina cases involve the necessity requirements under the 
relevant bilateral treaty (US- Argentina BIT) on non-precluded measures (NPM) clause and 
customary international law (ILC Draft Articles). In many occasions, arbitral tribunal, failed 
to interpret relevant treaty provision but it jumped into customary international law. Hence, 
this study will be focusing on effectiveness of interpretation of treaty provisions to some 
extent. 
 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
An investment dispute is defined as “a dispute between a contracting party and a national or 
company / enterprise of the other contracting party. A claim will typically arise in relation to 
the allege violation of an investment agreement or investment authorization entered into 
between the above mentioned parties (Leathley, 2007)”.  One of the main objectives of the 
                                                          
13
 Stone Sweet (2010), p3 
14
 Bruke-White, and  von Staden (2010) p 285 
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arbitral tribunals is to find amicable settlement to investment disputes. To achieve this, it has 
to consider on several other factors in general international law. Thus, in Azurix Corp. v. 
Argentine 
15
case Tribunal found that, when interpreting BIT it should be interpreted in 
accordance with the interpretation norms set forth by the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, since BIT is considered as an international treaty
16
.  
 
There are several other issues emerged during this particular study. First of all, tribunals are 
under pressure to equalize the settlement through considering both investors‟ and host 
states‟ perspectives to settle the problem harmoniously in the situation of host states‟ 
regulatory measures. However, it is questionable that how far above perspectives have taken 
into account effectively through application of principle of proportionality. At the same time 
principle of proportionality becomes importance as it has treaty status
17
 and it is not mere 
principle like others. This principle has been applied by ICSID tribunals after the Tecmed v. 
The United Mexican State
18
 award and subsequent arbitral awards.  Therefore, through this 
research, I try to seek the answers for what is meant by principle of proportionality?, 
whether it protects only the investors from future governmental measures?, and is it further 
giving assurance to the power of soverigninty.  
 
Secondly, according to Xiuli‟s (2006) explanation, “the proportionality demands more than 
the non-discrimination
 
treatment principle and is even regarded as an important principle
 
included in the fair and equitable treatment principle”. According to Stone Sweet and 
Mathews (2008, pp. 76-77), principle of proportionality consist of four tests such as 
                                                          
15
 Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/01/12) Award July 14 2006. Available at, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC507
_En&caseId=C5 
16
 Ibid para. 307, Article 31(1), of the VCLT  require that a treaty be “interpreted in good faith in accordance 
with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in light of its object and 
purpose”. 
17
 Article 5 of the ECT provides that „Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to 
achieve the objectives of this Treaty. See, Jan (2000)  p. 242 
18
 See, e.g., Tecnicas Medioam Bientales Tecmed v. The United Mexican States (Case no. ARB(AF)/00/2) 
Award May 29, 2003, available at, 
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC602
_En&caseId=C186 .  At para, 121; see also, Stone Sweet (2010) p.15 noted that, no arbitral tribunal referred 
to proportionality, even implicitly, before 2000. 
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„legitimacy‟, „necessity‟, „suitability‟, and „balancing in the strict sense‟19. If the arbitrators 
satisfy these requirements, measures taken by the host state may constitutional. However, 
there are doubts, whether arbitrators are in a position to analyze the legality of the 
governmental measures through applying criteria according to the particular treaty provision 
such as „public purpose‟, „non-discrimination‟, „due process‟ and „compensation‟ or above 
mentioned four tests, or applying these two criteria simanstaniously to come to a preferable 
solution. Still, it is not clear how investment tribunals can justify their awards by applying 
these proportionality analyzing criteria in the investment dispute particularly in host states‟ 
regulatory measures. 
 
Thirdly, fair and equitable treatment (FET) plays a vital role to determine the compensation 
or remedies; even if the host state‟s regulatory measures did not tantamount to indirect 
expropriation.  Thus, Stone Sweet states his views on the function of the FET in the arbitral 
Tribunal as, “FETS allows arbitrators to consider a wider range of elements than would 
normally be plausible under the tests for expropriation or regulatory takings (indirect 
expropriation); and the FETS facilitates the tailoring of appropriate remedies”20. Both 
proportionality principle and FET apply broadly in the investment disputes gives more 
opportunity to the arbitrators to thwart host states‟ measures which actually need to the 
development of the economy.  
 
Finally, generally, due to the lack of case law, investment arbitrators are applying 
proportionality principle by citing ECHR or WTO jurisprudence. Application of 
proportionality principle by these regional bodies has taken other factors as well when 
assessing „necessity‟ requirements such importance of social value, difficulties of 
implementation, margin of appreciation, good faith etc. Therefore, as part of this research, 
the effective function of the principle of proportionality really needs other factors, as above 
mentioned, should take into account when applying proportionality principle in investment 
dispute? Further, this study will be emphasis whether proportionality principle which 
belongs to jurisprudence, is applicable to investment disputes as well.  
 
                                                          
19
 However, some other scholars pointed out that proportionality principle consist three criteria to satisfy the 
court, see more detail, Jan, (2000) pp. 240-41; Ueda and Andenas (1998) p.3 
20
 Stone Sweet ( 2010 ) p.13 
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 1.3 Delimitation  
There are many investment tribunals to settle investment disputes. However, this research is 
limited to the discussion of the role of ICSID Tribunals on the application of proportionality 
in host states‟ regulatory measures.  This study includes the main elements of principle of 
proportionality with compared to other jurisdiction namely ECHR and WTO jurisprudence.  
Further, emphasis is given to the interpretation of Article XI of the US- Argentina BIT and 
Article 25 of the ILC Draft Articles. Further, for the purpose of this study I have selected 
cases which awarded after 2000 by the ICSID tribunal. Nevertheless, much focus has been 
given to necessary requirement on the situation of urgent economic crises.  
 
1.4 Literature Review and Relevant Concepts 
There are a number of books and articles written in the field of international investment 
law, investment arbitration and principle of proportionality. The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary (Christoph H. Schreuer, 2009) can be mentioned as one of the most relevant 
literatures to this subject area.   The author has well analyzed the ICSID convention by 
section by section. He has given an extensive knowledge on the jurisdiction of the ICSID 
tribunal in the light of Article 25 of the ICSID convention. Particularly, he has analyzed 
the wording of Article 25 of the Convention; with well described cases. Author has an 
analytical view on how the general measures that taken by host state could be a direct 
cause for a dispute out of an investment (paras, 106-112). Further, he states that „in order 
to be “arising directly”, disputes must have distinctive features linking them to the 
investment that are not shared by disputes unrelated to investments‟ (p. 104). In addition, 
this book contains vast knowledge on how to access to the ICSID tribunal, as well as, if the 
absence of contracting states to the Convention, how to access Additional Facility to settle 
the dispute amicably (paras, 202- 210).  
The „Principle of international Investment Law‘ (Dolzer and Schereuer, 2008) is mainly on 
International investment Law and arbitration practice is also another important literature 
related to the present study. This study mainly explains the distinguish feature of direct and 
indirect expropriation. It says that direct expropriations have become rare today.  Further, 
authors state that „states are reluctant to jeopardize their investment climate by taking the 
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drastic and conspicuous step of an open taking of foreign property. As a result of this, 
indirect expropriation has gained an importance (P.92)‟. Wisely, when drafting bi-
multilateral treaties the contracting parties include all types of taking.  In this regard, to 
further clarify the circumstances authors have discussed many bilateral treaty models, 
arbitral decision and academic writings.  Furthermore, they have reviewed the standard of 
treatment. The fair and equitable treatment standard is meant as a rule of international law 
and is not determined by the laws of the host state. As a result, the FET standard may be 
violated even if the foreign investors receive the same treatment as investors of the host 
state‟s nationality (p.123). In addition to this, it encloses a clear picture of various 
investment arbitrations.  
The ‘Proportionality Balancing and Global Constitution‘ (Stone Sweet, and Mathews, J., 
2008) traces the rich history of the Principle of Proportionality. Authors state that Principle 
of Proportionality was originated in German and now spread across Europe and 
Commonwealth system (p75). Proportionality principle analyzes whether right has been 
infringed by the governmental measures thus authors include four steps, each involving a 
test (pp 76, 77). They have identified the different views of proportionally principle and 
they have developed a theoretical explanation for why judges would find proportionality 
analysis attractively.  
 
 The International Law on Foreign Investment (Sornarah, 2008) is another important 
literature which focuses on extensive knowledge on various parts of international 
investment law. Generally, this book includes the definition of different terms of „taking‟ 
with historical perspective. Most importantly it covers the almost all situations of taking of 
foreign property and taking in violation of foreign investment agreement. Author further 
express his view on expropriation, and says that obvious situation of indirect taking of 
physical asserts could amount to expropriation. Thus, he has identified and categorized the 
circumstance that the governmental measures or regulation could be arise amount to taking 
(p358). Furthermore, this book contains enough knowledge on the differencing norms and 
views of the capital-exporting states and capital-importing states on determination of level 
of compensation.    
The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU law (Harbo Tor-Inge, 2010) brings a 
wider knowledge on principle of proportionality with relevant theories.  Author has well 
8 
 
developed arguments on proportionality principle as a general principle of EU law (p.159). 
Further, Harbo has found reasons why courts apply principles of law and states that by 
referring to a principle of law can imply that decision making is made more efficiently, and 
also it can limit the scope of arguments (pp.160-61). In addition to this, author has 
developed his arguments by quoting several schools of theories such as Alexy‟s, Darwkin, 
and Hart theory.  Furthermore, this article discusses the proportionality analysis based on 
horizontal and vertical dimension.  
The  Private Litigation in a Public Law Sphere: The Standard of Review in Investor-State 
Arbitrations (2010) by Bruke-White and von Staden,  is one of interesting article which 
focused the reasons of importance on application of public law issues into private investor 
– State arbitration.  Authors further state, that the application of numerous standards of 
reviews such as „least alternative requirement‟, the „only means‟ requirement, „margin of 
appreciation‟ and „good faith‟, are confusing (p.325). And also, they have express that they 
were not agreeing with Stone Sweet finding on principle of proportionality which helps 
balancing different conflict of interest.   
The Resolution of International Investment Disputes (Dimsey, 2008) illustrates the history 
of investment dispute resolution. This includes a number of reasons why foreign investors 
prefer international arbitration to settle disputes (pp. 7/9). When author talks about the 
ICSID convention, he says that even though ICSID provides an effective dispute resolution 
and its framework covered by the ICSID Convention, individual relationship, including the 
resolution of disputes, are regulated by various other instruments such as BIT (p.13). 
 
1.5 Research Questions and Objectives of the Study 
       There are some main researches questions arise when doing this particular study; 
1. How the applications of proportionality undermine the state soverigninty? 
2. What is the limit of the jurisdiction of ICSID tribunal, what are the powers that 
arbitrate have and how they utilize to achieve the balance between private rights 
and public benefit? 
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Objectives of the Research  
      This study mainly has four main objectives and they are as follows; 
 Describe the form of state inference of investor‟s property rights and evaluate 
whether regulatory measures tantamount to regulatory expropriation 
 To analyze the jurisdictional requirements to invoke ICSID jurisdiction to settle 
investment disputes amicably. 
 To identify the meaning, scope and application of principle of proportionality and 
fair and equitable treatment in the light of investment agreements/treaties. 
 To examine how ICSID tribunals are applied above principles to balance different 
conflicts of interests in the situation of state of necessity.  
 
1.6 Significance of the Study 
There are many reasons for me to select this research study. First of all, being a law 
lecturer in investment law I have a long time interest to do my Masters in this area. 
Secondly ICSID tribunals widely invoked as a dispute settlement mechanism in many bi-
multilateral treaties and many developed and developing states are ratified to it. Further, 
proportionality principle is a new and important area in the ICSID tribunals and attracts 
many scholars and academics to conduct further research. Finally, being a Sri Lankan 
academic I hope that this study will promote further understanding of the subject area and 
could contribute for the future research of the country. 
 
1.7 Research Methodology and Data Source 
Since this research is mainly on ICSID tribunals, the necessary data and information for 
this research is mainly collected through secondary sources. Number of published articles, 
books, journals, decided cases and international treaties have been used and analyzed to 
conduct this research study. In addition, many internet articles and web sites also referred 
for this work.  
The major analytical method of the study is descriptive and qualitative. 
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1.8 Structure of the Thesis  
For the depth study on selected area this thesis is divided in to five chapters. Chapter one is 
on „General Introduction‟ and provides a general overview to the entire thesis including the 
statement of the problem, literature review, methodology, objectives of the thesis etc.  
The second chapter is on „Forms of Indirect Expropriation‟ and define the definition of 
various types of taking. Further, this chapter discusses mainly how host state governmental 
measures could interfere on property rights of foreign investor.  In addition, this chapter 
also analyzes how governmental measures could be amount to indirect expropriation in the 
light of cases where ICSID tribunal awarded.  
Chapter three mainly discusses on the „The Scope and Objectives of the Principle of 
Proportionality and FET‟. Here, I am going to focus mainly on the elements included in the 
proportionality principle. Further, I have developed the arguments based on GATT Article 
XX on general exception and discussed how doctrine of margin of appreciation suits the 
principle of proportionality.  
The next chapter, chapter four identifies „the Role of ICSID on the Application of Principle 
of Proportionality‟ and discusses the development of these tribunals on the application of 
principle of proportionality and FET. Further, this also examines how this principle is 
applied when host state needs changes to the urgent situation like economic crisis, 
protection of environment and socio-economic development.    
The final chapter, chapter five carries the „Conclusion‟ to this research and focuses the 
ideas, if any, for the future development. 
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Chapter 2: Forms of Host State Interference 
This Chapter specially focuses on the clarification of different terminology used in taking 
of alien property and difference between direct and indirect expropriation in the light of 
academics, scholars‟ explanation and decision of ICSID cases. Thus, I have traced the 
history some extent. Particularly, I have discussed how regulatory measure can be 
identified as regulatory expropriation.  
2.1 Defining the Definition of Expropriation 
2.1.1 Confiscation, Nationalization, Expropriation 
Taking of foreign property has a long history. Before tracing the definition of 
expropriation, it is better to have a quick overview of different terminology used in taking 
of foreign property.  
Confiscation: In early days, there was no guarantee for the security of foreign personals as 
well as foreign properties located in different states as it was depended on the hands of 
rulers. In modern time, although guarantees are given for the protection and security of 
foreign investment, it is not fully implemented as it depends on many factors i.e. political 
and legal stability, security, good investment environment, etc. Historically, taking of alien 
property was a common practice. Alien properties were taken by a ruler or ruling coterie 
for personal benefit without compensation and it is identified as confiscation. After the 
decolonization, due to the raise of nationalist sentiment, many foreign industries were 
nationalized in large scale
21
.  
Nationalization: Nationalization and confiscation are two different concepts.  Sornarajah 
(2008, pp 349-50) defines the term „nationalization‟ as; “Nationalization referred to a 
situation in which a state embarks on a wholesale taking of property of foreigners to end 
their economic domination of the economy or sectors of the economy”. The purpose of 
nationalization is to expel the aliens by taking over the ownership of property and not 
                                                          
21 See, Sornarajah (2008) p. 349; Ratner  (2008) p.477   
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purpose of personal gain. Thus, Domain defines nationalization as; ―impersonal taking of 
the economic structure in full or in part for the nation‟s benefit, with or without 
compensation”22.  
In the situation of taking of foreign property, level of compensation
23
 is playing a vital role 
in determining its validity. There are different perspectives to determine the compensation. 
Capital-exporting countries are, mostly developed States, expecting „prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation‟24. It is meant „full compensation‟. On the other hand capital-
importing states are mostly developing States and obliged to pay „adequate 
compensation‟25.  It is doubt whether full compensation is ever paid in the situation of 
nationalization, even if contracting parties or States agree to full compensation through 
investment treaties. If States refuse to pay compensation or paying inadequate 
compensation nationalization resembles confiscation
26
.   
 
Expropriation: Expropriation
27
 of foreign asserts also has confirmed one of the major 
interference of property rights. Subsequently, next question to be answer is that, what is 
meant by expropriation and how it‟s differ from confiscation and nationalization. 
Obvisiouly, expropriation vary from confiscation since taking were took place for personal 
benefit. Similarly, expropriation is differing from nationalization according to Dolzer and 
Steven quote below
28
; 
“In general, expropriation applies to individual measures taken for a public purpose while 
nationalization involves large-scale taking on the basis of an executive or legislative act for 
the purpose of transferring property or interest into public domain”.  
                                                          
22
 Domain (1948, vol.8) p.1125 
23See, Ratne (2008) p.478 
24
  The formula of „prompt, adequate and effective compensation‟ was first used by Secretary of State Cordell 
Hull during the Mexican expropriations and generally referred to in literature as the „Hull Formula‟. 
25
 See, For more clarification, Sornarajah (2008) pp. 437 -38; Reinisch  (2008)  p.176; In generally, Cassese 
(2005)  pp 523-25;  
26
 See, supra note 22 
27
 See, Dolzer, Stevens., ICSID, (1995) p. 95 ,Bilateral Investment treaties,  The term “expropriation” also 
referred   as “dispossession”, “taking”, “deprivation” and “privation”. 
28 Ibid, ft.note 263 at p.98; Domke (1961)  p. 588)  
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This statement clearly clarifies differentiate between expropriation and nationalization. It is 
crucial to note that expropriation is one of the discriminatory measures targeting a single 
company. Similarly, Sornarajah, (2008) describes expropriation as, „targeting of a specific 
business, will be the more usual form of governmental interference with which the law has 
to be concern‟. Consequently, host state is in the position to prove the legality of 
expropriation. To prove legality of expropriation certain requirement should be fulfilled
29
. 
Dolzer and Schreuer (2008, p 91) expose four requirements to justify the legality of 
expropriation. Firstly, the measures taken by host state should be a „public purpose‟. 
General term of public purpose might be wide enough to cover number of host state‟s 
measures. Prudently, when drafting treaties contracting parties include clauses to narrow 
the scope of public purpose
30
. It is accepted norm in international law that the purpose 
should be a genuine/bonafide public purpose
31
 and must be exercised in good faith.  
Secondly, the measures must not be arbitrary or discriminatory. The non-discriminatory 
treatment depends on national treatment and most favored treatment. Host state has to pay 
more attention on above treatments when formulating and implementing of regulatory 
measures which affect foreign nationals or property. Non- discriminatory treatment of 
foreigners has been rooted in investment contracts and treaties. 
 Thirdly, procedure of expropriation must follow principle of due process
32
. Finally, 
expropriation measures must be accompanied by compensation. Further, Dolzer and 
Schreuer state that these requirements should be fulfilled cumulatively.  Even though, the 
host states meet these requirements, it is doubtful whether it should pay compensation. 
Many scholars say that taking is whether lawful or unlawful, compensation is essential. In 
contrast to this, Feldmen v. Mexico
33
 in 2002 the Tribunal states as follows;  
                                                          
29
 See also, Reinisch (2008)  
30
  See. e.g Newcombe and Paradell,  (2009) p.369, Art. V(1), Costa Rica-UK (1982)  specifically narrow the 
scope of permissible public purposes: „the public purpose must be related to the internal needs‟ of the state 
31
 See, ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/16), Awarded October 6, 2006, para, 432. 
32
 Ibid, para 435, the legal procedure must be of a nature to grant an affected investor a reasonable chance 
within a reasonable time to claim its legitimate rights and have its claims heard.  
33
Marvin Feldman v Mexico, Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1, award 16 December 2002 
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―[…] governments must be free to act in the broader public interest through 
protection of the environment, new or modified tax régimes, the granting or 
withdrawal of government subsidies, reductions or increases of in tariff levels, 
imposition of zoning restrictions and the like. Reasonable governmental 
regulation of this type cannot be achieved if any business that is adversely 
affected may seek compensation, and it is safe to say that customary 
international law recognizes this‖34   
In recent award by ICSID tribunal Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica
35
 decided 
differently and held States are in obligation to pay compensation even if severe 
environmental harm;   
“Expropriatory environmental measures – no matter how laudable and how 
beneficial to society as a whole-are in this respect, similar to any other 
expropriatory measures that a state may take in order to implement its 
policies: where property is expropriated, even for environmental purposes, 
whether domestic or international, the state‘s obligation to pay compensation 
remains”36. 
 
2.1.2 Property Rights as a Human Right  
Cassese (2005, P.120) states that international law has given high priority to protect the 
person and the property of foreigners and further says that the  “National and international 
courts have held that the foreigner may not be subject to arbitrary treatment and particular 
may not deprived of their property without fair compensation, they may not be subjected to 
military conscription”. Further, according to his statement, there is no doubt that the 
property rights are understood as one of the human rights. Ar.1 of the Protocol to the 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms define the 
protection of property in such a way; “Every natural person is entitled to the peaceful 
enjoyment of his possession. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except I the 
                                                          
34
 Ibid para 103 
35
 See, Compañia del Desarrollo de Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1, 
awarded February 17, 2000, 
36
 Ibid para 72 
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public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law”37. 
 
In addition to this, Vecuna (2003) express that the “[…] protection of private property is a 
vital element of the broader issue of protection of human rights‟. Even if, international law 
confers that a sovereign state has sovereignty on regulating its economy in order to 
enhance of welfare of its nation”38. At the same time, it requires to oblige international 
minimum standard treatment on foreigners
39
. Basically, International law principles 
provide a sovereign State to enjoy their sovereign right to regulate its domestic affairs. On 
the other hand, this exercise of such right is not unlimited and must have its boundaries. 
Hence, when a State enters into a bilateral investment treaty and provides number of 
investment protection guarantees, later on this BIT becomes supranational law and bound 
by it, and the investment-protection obligations it undertook therein must be honored rather 
than be ignored by a later argument of the State‟s right to regulate40. Similarly, Newcombe 
and Paradell‟s (2009, p.329) state that, “International expropriation law mediates between 
two general principles of international law. One is that states exercise permanent 
sovereignty over their territories and natural resources. And the second is that states must 
respect the acquired rights of foreigners” 
 
Now, it is a well developed principle in international law that the host states cannot take 
foreign properties without any compensation. Violating international obligations which 
recognized by the principle of international law may lead to international responsibility
41
. 
Ar. 31 (1) of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 
Acts provides that, ―the responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for 
the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act”. Further, this was discussed in LG 
                                                          
37
 See, Article 1 of the Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms -March 20, 1952 
38
 See also, Dolzer and Schreuer., (2008)  p.89 
39
 See, ibid, p.89; Sornarajah (2008) pp. 318-19 
40
 Supra note 23, p. 423 
41
Article 31 (1) of the ILC Draft Articles ; see also,   Tschanz and Viñuales., (2009) p.731;  Hobér, (2008,  
25), author explains in his study that, „there is yet another aspect of public international law which is 
crucially important in investment arbitration, i.e., the law of state responsibility‟. 
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&E v. Argentina
42
 case as, “it is well established in international law that the most 
important consequence of the committing of wrongful act is the obligation for State to 
make reparation for the injury caused by that act”43. In this case tribunal agreed with 
Claimants that the appropriate standard for reparation under international law is „full‟ 
reparation as set out by the PCIJ in the Factory at Chorzow case and Article 31 of the ILC 
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
44
.  
 
2.2 Direct and Indirect Expropriation 
Once a foreign investor enters into a host state he and his assets are subject to laws of the 
host state. Hence, host state may bring amendments to the existing laws or economical 
reforms in order to enhance welfare of the people as a whole which derives from its State 
obligation. 
In  the case of developing countries, in order to attract more inflow of investment  they  
enact laws and regulations,  or alter existing laws relating to liberalization of trade and give 
guarantees to protect foreign investment rather than expropriate
45
. Foreign investment is 
also one of the very important components for the economic development of developing 
countries.  As a result, host states are reluctant to expropriate directly and create a bad 
publicity among international world.  Thus, host state may bring number of measures 
which can cause serious negative impact on foreign investor, even though foreign investor 
having his ownership. 
It is necessary to know the differences between direct and indirect expropriation. As 
mentioned above, direct expropriation means; host states directly seize the tangible or 
intangible property of foreign individuals by means of administrative or legislative 
                                                          
42
 LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/1) Award, July 25, 2007) 
43
 Ibid, para 29 
44
 Ibid para 31 
45
 See, e.g, Article 5 of the Law of the people‟s Republic of China on Foreign-Capital Enterprises, 
http://www.fdi.gov.cn/pub/FDI_EN/Laws/law_en_info.jsp?docid=51034; Article 157 of the 1978 
Constitution of Sri Lanka Available at, 
http://www.priu.gov.lk/Cons/1978Constitution/Chapter_20_Amd.html 
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action
46
. On the other hand, without making any harm to the ownership of the property
47
 or 
the investors, host state try to interfere in investors‟ activities through its own motion or by 
agents, is can define as indirect expropriation
48
. Dolzer and Schreuer (2008, p. 92) make 
clear distinction between direct and indirect expropriation, ―the differences between a 
direct or formal expropriation and indirect expropriation turns on whether the legal title of 
the owner is affected by the measure in question”. 
Ultimately, in the situations of direct and indirect of foreign investment are brought to the 
control of host state. Sornarajah
49
 in his study, has usefully categorized form of host State 
interference other then direct expropriation, such as, forced sales of property, forced sales 
of shares, indigenization  measures, taking over management control over the investment, 
including others to take over the property physically, failure to provide protection, 
administrative decisions which cancel licences and permit necessary, exorbitant taxation, 
expulsion of the foreign investor contrary to international law, acts of harassment such as 
freezing of bank accounts or promoting strikes, lockouts and labour shortages. Likewise, in 
PSEG v Turkey
50
 case tribunal by citing Pope and Talbot case that indirect expropriation 
can take many forms and says as, “there must be some form of deprivation of the investor 
in the control of the investment, the management of day-to-day operations of the company, 
interfering in the administration, impeding the distribution of dividends, interfering in the 
appointment of officials and managers, or depriving company of its property or control in 
total or part”51. 
Consequently, host states measures are considered utmost important to determine the direct 
or indirect expropriation. This statement is further confirmed by Dolzer and Filix (2003, p. 
156)  and they say that, “one prominent aspect of questions of indirect expropriation is the 
                                                          
46
 See, LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E International Inc. v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/02/1 Decision on Liability (October 03, 2006), para 187 
47
 Ibid para, 188, Ownership or enjoyment can be said to be “neutralized” where a party no longer is in 
control of the investment, or where it cannot direct the day-to-day operations of the investment (by citing, 
Pope & Talbot Inc. v. Canada, Interim Award, 100 (26 June 2000) 
48
 See, Newcombe and Paradel (2009) p. 332 
49
 See, Sornarajah, (2008)  p.358 ; Reisman and Sloane (2004) p.124 
50
 PSEG Global Inc. and Konya Ilgin Elektrik Üretim ve Ticaret Limited Sirketi v. Republic of Turkey (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/02/5) Award January 19, 2007 
51
 Ibid para 278 
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role, if any, that the purpose and circumstance of a particular governmental action can play 
in the legal assessment of whether expropriation has occurred”. Mostly, bi-multilateral 
treaties and investment contracts include a term on expropriation to include all type of 
direct and indirect expropriation.  For an example, Article 1110 of NAFTA 
52
 “includes not 
only open, deliberate and acknowledge taking of property, such as outright seizure or 
formal or obligatory transfer of the title in favour of the host state, but also cover or 
incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of depriving owner, on 
whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably to-be-expected economic benefit or 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host state”53. 
Generally, all these classifications of governmental regulatory measures may not lead to 
indirect expropriations. It is based on case by case analysis. Investors are in struggle to 
persuade the tribunal those regulatory measures tantamount to indirect expropriation. In 
this regard, investor‟s legitimate expectation plays a key role. Hence, host states are in a 
position to respect the existence of legitimate expectation of investor. Because, at the entry 
of investment, legal framework provided by the host state including minimum standard of 
treatment, stabilization clause will be an important source of legitimate expectation on the 
part of the investor. On the other hand, investors should be expecting some foreseeable 
events in its long duration. Therefore, it cannot argue that every change in the laws of host 
state affecting foreign property will violate legitimate expectation
54
. In many cases tribunal 
has taken into account of legitimate expectation of the investor as an important element to 
determine whether indirect expropriation has arisen. For instance Tecmed v. Mexican case 
the tribunal states;  
 ―[…], the claimant had legitimate reasons to believe that the operation of 
the Landfill would extend over the long term. […] the claimant expectation 
was that of a long term investment relaying on the recovery of its investment 
                                                          
52
 See. e.g.  Article 1110 of NAFTA provides that “No party may directly or indirectly nationalize or 
expropriate an investment of an investor of another party in its territory or take a measures tantamount to 
nationalization or expropriation such an investment („‟expropriation”), except: (a).for public purpose; (b) on 
a nondiscriminatory basis; (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and (d) on payment 
of compensation‟.  
53
See,  Metalclad Corporation v. United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1) Award August 30, 
2000 para, 103 
54
 Dolzer and Schreuer (2008). P 105 
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and the estimated return through the operation of the landfill during its 
entire useful life‖55 
It is important to note that deprivation of enjoyment of property rights of the investor is the 
central point to determine whether indirect expropriation has occurred. In Middle East 
Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Egypt
56case tribunal held, “when measures are 
taken by a State the effect of which is to deprive the investor of the use and benefit of his 
investment even though he may retain nominal ownership of the respective rights being the 
investment, the measures are often referred to as a „creeping‟ or „indirect‟ expropriation or, 
as in the BIT, as measures „the effect of which is tantamount to expropriation‟. As a matter 
of fact, the investor is deprived by such measures of parts of the value of his investment”57.  
Similarly, Article 10 (3) (a), of the Draft Convention on International Responsibility of 
States for Injuries to Aliens provides, “any such unreasonable interference with use, 
enjoyment, or disposal of property as to justify an interference that the owner there of will 
not be able to use, enjoy, or dispose of the property within a reasonable period of time after 
the inception of such interference”58. In the Antoine Goetz and others v. Republic of 
Burundi
59
 tribunal decided that the withdrawal of the certificate of free zone constituted a 
measure tantamount to expropriation, defined in Article 4 of the BIT as a “measure 
depriving of or restricting property rights.”60 In contrast, PSEG v. Republic of Turkey case 
tribunal says that, “[…] none of the measures adopted envisaged the taking of property, 
which is still the essence of expropriation, even indirect expropriation. Although, measures 
tantamount to expropriation may well make the question of ownership irrelevant”61 
 
However, due to the act of host state, negative effect of on an investment cannot 
automatically be considered expropriation. Therefore, it is well established principle that 
                                                          
55
 See supra note 18, at para 149 
56
Middle East Cement Shipping and Handling Co. S.A. v. Arab Republic of Egypt (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/99/6)Awarded, April 12, 2002 
57
 Ibid para 107 
58
 See also, Weiner (2004) p.167 
59
 Antoine Goetz and others v. Republic of Burundi (ICSID Case No. ARB/95/3) Award, February 10, 1999 
60
 Ibid, Introductory Note, p. 455 
61
 See supra note 48, para 279 
20 
 
an expropriation to occur, it is necessary for the investor to be deprived in whole or 
significant part of the property or effective control of  its investment or for its investment 
to be deprived in whole or significant parts its value.
62
   
  
2.3  Regulatory Measures v.  Regulatory Expropriation 
Mostly, host states are developing countries and they are under responsibility to develop 
many public interests. Enhancing welfare of people such as health, education, transport, 
safety etc. is one of its primary objectives. On the other hand developed states try to 
regulate market behaviors through its legislation such as antitrust, consumer protection, 
securities, environmental protection, planning and land use
63
. Consequently, they have to 
bring number of regulatory measures, generally or specifically, which may bring changes 
to the foreign investment considerably, by it-self or as part of the general economy
64
. 
Therefore, to decide whether regulatory measures of the host state lead to an indirect 
expropriation, is based on the effect of the measures upon the economic benefit, value and 
control over the investment
65
.  These measures are sometimes identify as tantamount to 
expropriation
66
 and may called as „indirect expropriation‟, „creeping expropriation‟67, 
„constructive expropriation‟ or „de facto expropriation‟68. As a result of this, investors may 
claim that indirect expropriation has arisen due to host state‟s measures. Obviously, it 
cannot be argued that all the measures will be tantamount to indirect expropriation. Some 
kind of measures really need effective function of government and these can be justifiable 
under the arbitration tribunal. Customary international law also recognized that States have 
                                                          
62
 See, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES-Tisza Erömü Kft. v. Republic of Hungary (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/22) Award September23, 2010, Para. 14.3.1 
63
 See,  Sornarajah, (2008) p.357 
64
 See, Dolzer, ( 2003) p.66); 
65
 Dolzer and Schreuer (2008) p.101 
66
 See, Dolzer and Bloch (2003) [citing S.D. Myres Inc v. Canada, partial Award, 121 I.L.R 72, 123, Para 
285, ft.note 14 at 68], “considering the phrase “tantamount to expropriation”, the Tribunal stressed the 
“tantamount” was to be equated with “equivalent” and that their required that “the real interests involved and 
the purpose and effect of the government measures rather than “technical of facial consideration” be decisive 
in this context”.  
67
 See, Reisman and Sloane (2004)  p.124  
68
 However, these different terminologies that refer to expropriation do not have clear definition. See,  
Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, see supra note 18, p114. 
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a right to regulate commercial and business activities within its territory
69
. Further, arbitral 
tribunals also held that State has the right to adopt measures having a social or general 
welfare purpose
70
.  At the same time it has a duty to prevent the worsening of the situation 
and could not simply leave events to follow their own course, therefore, “it is quite evident 
that measures had to adopted to offset the unfolding crisis”71. 
 
In addition to this, tribunal is observed by The American Law Institute‘s Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States in AES v. Republic of Hungary, 
“a state is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic disadvantage resulting 
from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for crime, or other action of the kind 
that is commonly accepted as within the police power of the states, if it is not 
discriminatory […].”72. Although, in AES v. Argentina case Tribunal did not accept the 
arguments put forwarded by respondent that the measures taken were general bearing 
aimed at restoring the economy and were not specifically related to or targeted Claimant‟s 
investment and the dispute did not arise directly out of an investment
73
. In this case 
tribunal said that, 
 ―[…] as a sovereign State, the Argentina Republic had a right its 
economic policies; but this does not mean that the foreign investors under 
a system of guarantee and protection could be deprived of their respective 
rights under the instruments providing them with these guarantees and 
protection […].Under this provision, directness has to do with the 
relationship between the dispute and the investment rather than between 
measures and investment‖74 (emphasis added).  
 
                                                          
69
 Mostafa (2008) p.267 
70
  ibid  Para 195 
71
 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic, ( ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3) paras  
306-308) 
72
 Mostafa (2008) p 196;  AES v. Hungary award, Supra note 62, Para 14:3:4, it was concluded that the 
effects of reintroduction of the Price Degrees do not amount to an expropriation 
73
 AES Corporation v. Argentina Republic (Case No. ARB/02/17) cited in Schreuer (2009, p.113 at 134) 
74
 Ibid  paras 57,60 
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Further, Tribunal has accepted that the sovereign States have rights regarding their 
economy. On the other hand, it has some other contractual commitments with foreign 
investors through its binding agreements, or bi-multilateral treaties. It may grant a number 
of incentives or may include stabilization clause
75
 when parties have chosen applicable law 
as host state‟s law, which says that subsequent changes of laws will not affect the 
particular investment. Consequently, foreign investors are subject to a kind of special law; 
it is neither host state‟s law nor home state‟s law. In CMS Gas Transmission Company v. 
Argentine Republic
76
 case Tribunal concludes that it does not have jurisdiction to examine 
host state‟s measures of general economic policy and it cannot pass judgment on whether 
they are right or wrong.  Arbitral tribunal does not have power to interfere in domestic 
issues. But it has jurisdiction to examine whether specific measures affecting the Claimant 
investment or measures of general economic policy is having a direct violation of legally 
binding commitments which made to the investor in treaties, legislation or contracts
77
. 
 
It is very essential to note that how far governmental measures deprive property rights of 
investors according to their respective treaty provisions. If those host states regulatory 
measures affects so, regulatory measures turn into regulatory expropriation. Thus, in  
Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, case Tribunal said that,  
―[[…] investor] was radically deprived of the economical use and enjoyment 
of its investments, as if the rights related thereto—such as the income or 
benefits related to the [property] or to its exploitation—had ceased to exist. In 
other words, if due to the actions of the Respondent, the assets involved have 
lost their value or economic use for their holder and the extent of the loss. This 
determination is important because it is one of the main elements to 
distinguish, from the point of view of an international tribunal, between a 
regulatory measure, which is an ordinary expression of the exercise of the 
state‘s police power that entails a decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto 
expropriation that deprives those assets and rights of any real substance‖78. 
                                                          
75
 More explanation see, Begic (2005)  pp. 84-98) 
76
 CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic ICSID Case No. ARB/01/8), Decision on 
Jurisdiction of July 17, 2003. 
77 Ibid, Para. 33   
78
 See Azurix Corp. v. Argentine  award, supra note 18, para. 115 
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In  Azurix Corp. v. Argentine
79
 case tribunal point out by citing S.D. Myers case, public 
purpose is an helpful criterion to distinguish the measures which state is liable; “Parties [to 
the BIT] are not liable for economic injury that is the consequence of bona fide regulation 
within the accepted police powers of the State”. Further, for more clarification tribunal has 
referred Judge R. Higgins explanation, he tries to find answer for the difference between 
expropriation and regulation based on public purpose; 
―Is not the State in both cases (that is, either by a taking for a public 
purpose, or by regulating) purporting to act in the common good? And in each 
case has the owner of the property not suffered loss? Under international law 
standards, a regulation that amounted (by virtue of its scope and effect) to a 
taking would need to be ‗for a public purpose‘ (in the sense of in general, 
rather than for a private interest). And just compensation would be due. At the 
same time, interferences with property for economic and financial regulatory 
purposes are tolerated to a significant extent
80.‖ 
 
It is crucial to note, excessive power of host states on measures may constitute 
expropriation. Normally, existence of regulatory actions or measures of the government 
will not be eliminated from the definition of expropriation. Most instances, government 
argues that the measures taken by it, even if it contains negative impact to the investor, for 
public purpose which is no compensable taking. In this situation, Arbitral Tribunal will be 
taken into account on all negative impacts caused by the measures or actions and to 
determine the characteristic of expropriation, whether such measures are proportion to the 
protected public purpose and investor‟s right/ protection which are agreed to grand under 
investment treaty. Thus, negative impacts of the measures have played a key role to 
determine the proportional. Therefore, how Tribunal can examine the governmental 
measures tantamount to indirect expropriation; has gained significant now. Thus, 
arbitrators invoke general principles of international law to interpret investment treaty 
provisions regarding expropriation. Generally, BITs do not define clearly what constitute 
an expropriation and they include an express term “expropriation” and add “any other 
                                                          
79
 See supra note 15, para 310 
80
 Ibid para 310,(by citing, Judge R. Higgins, The Taking of Property by the  State: Recent Developments in 
International Law, Recueil des Caurs. Vol III(1982),p 331)  
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action that has equivalent effects”. They do not express which measures or actions would 
constitute acts “tantamount to expropriation”. Therefore the Tribunal should have to look 
to international law in determining the relevant criteria for evaluating the claim
81
.On this 
point Schill (2009, p.10) states that the “general principle of international law can also be 
used in order to elucidate complex questions involving  the interpretation of broadly 
formulated substantive standers  of treatments  such as fair and equitable treatment or the 
concept of indirect expropriation or as a basis to develop solutions for procedural issues 
that investment tribunal face”. In this view, application of Principle of Proportionality and 
FET are played a significant part in determining the regulatory measures.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
. 
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Chapter III: The Scope and the Objective of Principle of 
Proportionality and FET 
 
This chapter identifies the elements of principle of proportionality and compare with 
legality of indirect expropriation. Most importantly, this chapter tries to draw the link 
between proportionality principle and investment law and also emphasis comparative 
thinking of other jurisdictions.  
 
3.1. The Concept of Principle of Propoionality 
Principle of proportionality is not a new phenomenon in the international Law. This 
principle has emerged as a tool in balancing of two different conflicts of interest in many 
legal orders and systems
82
. To the effective function of this principle tribunals reluctant to 
give priority to any other interests. This is recognized as „general principle‟ of international 
law
83
. Unwritten German origin
84
 proportionality principle is older than the German 
constitution. It was initially applied in the late nineteenth century by the administrative 
courts of German to police measures that encroached upon individual‟s liberty or 
properties
85
. Because of its practicability and flexibility, proportionality principle is now 
widely spread
86
 in the field of human rights law, humanitarian law, criminal law and in the 
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 See, Andenas and Zleptnig, ( 2007) p.337  
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field of international trade through WTO laws
87
. Recently, principle of proportionality has 
been applied in challenging governmental measures in the indirect expropriation cases. 
Principle of Proportionality has been grown up by judges and is considered as a preferable 
procedure for resolving disputes between two different rights claims
88
which involve a right 
of individual person and general public interest.  
 
Principle of proportionality is a political maxim which means whatever actions taken by a 
government should not exceed the necessary to achieve the objective of the government
89
. 
Also it is an important device for judges to check the regulatory measures of the 
government. However, several scholars define the meaning of principle of proportionality 
in numerous ways
90
. Some says that the proportionality principle does not have any 
substantial meaning other than merely a balancing tool
91
 while some others say judges use 
this principle only to manipulate their decision
92
. According to Xuili‟s (2006) arguments, 
even though, principle of proportionality is considered as a neutral concept, by applying 
this principle, the context of State soverigninty has weakened and right of private property 
has strengthened. Further, author argues that its application in investment arbitration has 
led to protecting the right of private property significantly and encroaching upon regulatory 
discretion of the host country stealthily.  Schurler also has quoted the well known 
American judge Antonin Scalia in his study, who states that “the proportionality principle 
is an invitation for judges to impose their own substantive values”.  Further, Xuili express 
that Scalia does not believe that the law offer criteria to allow a court to determine whether 
a decision taken by the national authorities are proportionate
93
. However, mostly agree 
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with that the proportionality principle maintains to preserve individual rights as well as 
public interest by analyzing governmental measures
94
.  
 
Harbo (2010, p.171) noted in his study that the „ECJ applies the proportionality principle 
when it balances legislative and administrative measures against private interests, 
individual rights and fundamental freedoms‟. Thus, Yoram Dinstein ( 2005, p. 352) 
express his views on the principle of proportionality in a such a way that “an 
administrative decision is lawful only if the means used to achieve its objective is of proper 
extent. It focuses on the relationship between the objective and the means used to achieve 
it”. Similarly, ECJ applies proportionality principle, as a rationality test, more concretely, 
the principle implies that the testing of a legislative (or administrative) measure or means is 
appropriate (suitable) and necessary in order to reach or achieve a given goal or 
objective
95
. 
 
According to Engle „proportionality (means end testing) with balancing (cost benefit 
analysis) or with examining the relationship between the value of the right invaded and the 
extent of the invasion of that right‟96. Finally, to draw a conclusion by analyzing these 
explanations, this principle requires some relationship between means and ends. Therefore, 
means chosen by the administration or legislation authorities should be suitable. At the 
same time it is necessary to achieve a lawful end and most importantly there are not any or 
less alternative measures or should not be more restrictive than necessary.  
 
Basically, principle of proportionality reviews whether regulatory measure is excessive and 
arbitration tribunal analyses whether it breaches balance between investor rights and public 
interests According to public choice theory, it is essential to identify intention of political 
officers as well, because, their decision mostly subject to a short-term objectives and it is 
doubt whether actual public benefits were there. Therefore, judicial review is necessary to 
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ensure that their actions are not differed from protectionism, or shady means to deprive the 
private sector of its property rights, or malicious and fictitious exercises of power
97
. 
 
Before trace the role of ICSID tribunal on the application of above principle it is 
significant to note which elements that proportionality principle has contain. 
 
3.1.1 Proportionality Standard Criteria & Criteria for Legality of Regulatory 
Measures 
 
Principle of proportionality‟s definition itself brings three separate criteria to satisfy 
administrative or legislative measures. In other way, proportionality is testing the measures 
which qualify certain criteria. Thus, Andenas and Zleptnig wrote, “Proportionality is 
commonly referred to as a legal principle. It can also be described as test or standard, but 
its legal character is one of a principle”98.  According to European context, measure should 
be appropriate or suitable, measure must be necessary and measure must be proportionate 
to the objective (sometimes identified as “proportionate stricto sensu”)99. On this point 
Stone Sweet and Mathews are suggesting four steps. Thus, they include “legitimacy” as 
First step which refers that the judge confirms the government is constitutionally 
authorized to take such a measures
100
. It is an important criterion to go ahead with the 
governmental measures is depended on its legitimacy thus it is kept in first in above four 
criteria.  If the purpose of the government‟s measure is not a constitutionally legitimate 
one, then it violates a higher norm (the right being pleaded)
101
. When it compared with the 
principles of legality of expropriation, as I mentioned above there should be a genuine 
public purpose in order to qualify lawful expropriation. One can argue that the 
governmental measure is constitutionally legitimate when there is a genuine public 
purpose.  
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The second step, “suitability”, requires that the measures must be appropriate to protect the 
interest in question and presuppose a degree of causal relationship between the measure 
and the objective pursued
102
. Simply, the measure must suite the objective and this test 
avoids unsuitable measures which lead to arbitrary or discriminatory. One who can argue 
simply the measure is not suitable at all to objective of public interest. Hence, suitability of 
measures depends on case by case analysis. In the given situation, arbitrators in a position 
to evaluate suitability of measures from an ex ante perspective (the moment when the 
measures was enacted) or an ex post perspective ( the moment when the measure is 
analyzed by the court).
103
  
 
The third step is “necessity”. It means that the measures has taken foremost important to 
achieve the objective and to confirm that there is no other  less restrictive alternative is 
available to accomplished the same end
104
. In ECHR jurisprudence, „Strasbourg organs 
require Member States to adopt the measure which is the least burdensome on an 
individual person‟s rights but is equally capable of achieving the same legitimate 
objective‟105 . According to the UNO, a state of necessity depends on the simultaneous 
existence of three circumstances, such as, firstly; a danger to the survival of the State, and 
not for its interest, is necessary; secondly, that the danger must not have been created by 
the acting State; finally, the danger should be serious and imminent, so that there are no 
other means of avoiding it
106
.  The admissibility of necessity leads to an idea that the state 
of necessity is to prevent from risk of suffering certain damages. It means how States could 
protect from unavoidable emergency situation.  
 
Normally, arbitral tribunal analyzes of necessity accordance with Article 25 of the ILC 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility on Wrongful Acts. It requires first, that the act must 
be the only means available to the State in order to protect an interest (see below 4.2). It 
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also important to note, the principle of necessity will not apply if there is any casual link 
between the conduct of the State and the situation of necessity
107
.   
 
The measures has taken by the host state is suitable, and at the same time necessary to 
achieve the objective than there is no room for discriminatory treatment. Therefore, 
proportionality application requires non discriminatory treatment (see below 3.2).  
 
The last step is “proportionate stricto sensu”. In this last step it is to prove the measures 
must not be excessive or disproportionate with regard to the pursued objective
108
. It must 
follow due process of law when measures are taken by government. If the investor incurred 
higher disadvantage due to the excessive of measures, even if the measures necessary to 
aim pursued objectives, may still consider disproportionate
109
. It is required implicitly 
measures must not excessive and at the same time compensation should be providd. Most 
immortally, when assessing these requirements, each and every principle should be given 
equal weight. However, it is doubtful whether ICSID tribunal has followed these criteria 
concurrently and effectively to achieve real sense of proportionality principle 
110
(will be 
discussed in detail in Chapter IV). 
 
3.1.2 World Trade Organization (WTO)  
 
Andaneas and Zlepting  (2007. p.374) pinpoint that, “WTO agreement provide for a more 
sophisticated way of balancing, taking account of the individual circumstances at stake, 
and the competing rights and interest involved
”
. WTO agreements
111
 provide explicitly 
general exception provisions which allow Member States to enforce measures necessary to 
protect public morals, human, animal or plant life or health
112
 . This includes tow-tier test, 
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one is to qualify the necessity requirement of provisional jurisdiction listed in paragraphs 
(a) to (j) and under the Chapeau/introductory clause of the Article XX. Bossche (2008, pp, 
287-88) states, by Citing US – Gasoline, to provisionally justified under  Article XX(b) 
that it should succeed two-tier test,  the measure is designed for the stated purpose and the 
measure is necessary to fulfill that policy objective. Author further says that the necessary 
requirement so problematic than requirement of stated purpose.  
 
Necessary requirements depend on case by case analysis, thus, each Member States has to 
determine what level of protection they need, In the Asbestos case
113
 the AB held that “it is 
undisputed that WTO Members have right to determine the level of protection of health 
that they consider appropriate in given situation. French has determined, and the panel 
accepted.”114 In this case Appellate Body clarified the meaning formulated in Thailand - 
Cigarettes
115
 and US - Gasoline
116
 that there is “no alternative to the measures at issue that 
the Member could reasonably be expected to employ”117, therefore, alternative measures is 
only excluded if there is a „reasonably available‟ alternative measure. This approach has 
been applied in the ICSID tribunal in Continantal Casualty
118
 case, while in Enron
119
 case, 
tribunal observed the „only way‟ available test. These two tests are more differential than 
others
120
 will be discussed more detail below.  
 
Furthermore, these requirements resembling the proportionality test such as suitability and 
necessity. The third step of the proportionality principle on proportionate stricto sensu has 
been developed by GATT and WTO panel on the evaluation of range of standard review. 
In this regard they analyze whether taken measures are inconsistent or less inconsistent 
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with WTO agreement. United States – Section 337121 case described the applicable 
standard for evaluating whether a measure is „necessary‟ under Article XX (d) as follows: 
―[…] in cases where a measure consistent with other GATT provisions is not 
reasonably available, a contracting party is bound to use, among the measure 
reasonably available it, that which entails the least degree of inconsistency with 
other GATT provisions‖.122  
It is also to note that a measure is not „ “indispensable”, may nevertheless “necessary” 
within the meaning of Article XX (d), in every case a process of weighing and balancing 
involves.
123
   Therefore, WTO dispute settlement goes one more steps to evaluate standards 
of review based on concept of proportionality principle.   
According to these findings, it is very vital to note that ICSID tribunal has referred to the 
principle of proportionally based on WTO jurisprudence. In continental casualty tribunal 
has cited many WTO cases to determine whether a measure is necessary. Thus, Tribunal 
referred  “EC Tyres (7.104), summing up the Appellant Body case law  in Korea- Beef 
(para 164), EC-Asbestos case (para 172), US-Gambling (para 306), Dominican Republic-
Cigarettes (para 70) within this weighing and balancing of those various factors, the WTO 
case law stresses the assessment of the importance of interests or values furthered by 
challenged measure”124. 
For above discussed reasons, to identify the role of WTO case law also very significant in 
the evaluation of scope and requirements of necessary in investment disputes cases.  
 
3.1.3 Doctrine of Margin of Appreciation and Principle of Proportionality 
Doctrine of Margin of appreciation derived from European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR)
125
. This doctrine has a close connection with the principle of proportionality. It 
can say that the principle of proportionality and margin of appreciation are two sides of a 
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same coin. In European Context, margin of appreciation is allowed, in certain degree, 
measure of discretion to the Member State in accordance with their own national situations 
and conditions
126
.  In contrast, proportionality principle has been regarded to restrain the 
power of State authorities. On the other word, the principle of proportionality should be 
deployed as a device to ascertain whether national authorities have overstepped their 
margin of appreciation
127
. Accordingly, margin of appreciation does not prevent judicial 
review, but it limits the scope of tribunals‟ inspection on governmental measures.  
  
Margin of appreciation allow national authority to enjoy discretion to adopt measures 
relating to public/national interest.  Therefore, each individual States know what their 
government actually need to particular situation. Thus, States‟ authorities are in better 
position to determine regarding their legitimate public need than international tribunals. 
Margin of appreciation more suites in investment dispute also. Because, investment 
tribunals agreed that the host states has sovereign right to regulate its economy.  However, 
Bruke-White and von Staden ( 2010, p.324)  state different view on this point, they say  
that “the least restrictive alternative, the margin of appreciation, and good faith review are 
distinct and independent standard with separate jurisprudential approaches to balance 
competing rights and interest”. Further, authors continue that “attempts to meld two or 
more of these approaches into a single standard of review are dangerous because of the 
distinct balancing mechanism each standard employs”.  
 
3.2 The Link between Principle of Proportionality & Investment Law 
It is notable that varieties of clauses on standard of treatments are enclosed in international 
investment contracts and treaties such as FET, full protection, treatment no less favorable 
then that required by international law, national treatment, most favored treatment, and 
giving guarantees not to engage in non-discriminatory treatment or measures with restrict 
the operation, maintenance, expansion or disposition of investment. Without doubt, all-
most all the bi-multilateral treaties have included these treatments in order to protect and 
promote foreign investment. Proportionality principle also fundamentally based on non-
discriminatory treatment. It assess whether governmental measures control the use and 
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enjoyment of the property rights of investor.  Consequently, when analyzing   principle of 
proportionality in the face of investment, it includes the non-discriminatory treatment 
principle and the FET principle
128
. Therefore, there is a place to include investment law 
into application of proportionality principle.  
 
Further, as mentioned above there are some criteria to the application of proportionality 
principle, which should be applied cumulatively. This will be more appropriate to other 
legal issues such as humanitarian law, human rights law and even WTO laws, which has 
separate harmonized body of laws or treaties, which bind all the contracting parties. But 
investment law does not contain a multilateral treaty which binds all the contracting party 
irrespective of their nationality.  Once investment disputes brought before ICSID tribunal, 
it has to confirm ICSID jurisdiction by assessing ICSID Convention as well as relevant 
treaty (bi/multi) or contract. Consequently, it cannot say that all the criteria of 
proportionality principle will be applied cumulatively, it is depend on case by case analyse 
and relevant treaty provisions. Mostly, tribunals discussed whether necessity requirements 
were satisfied accordance with relevant treaty provision and Customary International law    
(see 4.2).   
 
Generally, there are some explicit exceptions which allow States to enforce measures 
regarding unexceptional circumstance i.e. threats to internal and external security, 
economic crisis, terrorism, public health emergencies or a natural disaster. For instance, 
Article 30 of the Treaty of European Union
129
 provide Member States to elude  from 
liability by adopting measures pertaining to justifiable  grounds “[…] on the protection of 
health and life of humans, animals or plants. This provision is similar to GATT Article XX 
general exception. Likewise, bilateral treaties also contain a non-precluded measures 
(NPM) clause which contracting parties are allowed to take measures essential to public 
interest. Thus Bruke-White and von Staden, (2010, p.302) state that the “Article XX and 
XXI of the GATT provide states with defenses very similar to those found in the NPM 
clause of various BITs”. Therefore, host states regulatory measures can be justifiable when 
it take in urgent circumstances, under NPM clause. US- Argentina BIT also contains a 
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similar provision (Article XI). In this regard, Aaker (2009, p 523) express that the, 
Argentina‟s invocation of state necessity in the BIT and customary international law, due 
to its economic crisis in 2000/2001 was not accepted by the majority of the tribunals. The 
reason behind this general exception clause is to avoid or minimize risks due to  
unforeseen external shocks, hence, arbitral tribunals should give due consideration when 
interpreting these clauses is very essential.  
 
 
3.3 Fair and Equitable Treatment 
Fair and equitable treatment
130
 is one of the most powerful rights of foreign investor which 
investment tribunal often discuss in investment dispute cases. FET was first found in 
Havana Charter for International Trade Organization of 1948
131
. Foreign investment, 
involves more than two nations; trust and confidence are the basic elements. Therefore, to 
build up commercial relationship and to achieve real development, contracts should be 
energetic for certain period. Without doubt, FET and principle of proportionality are 
developed together with investment contracts and treaties. Some scholars say that 
application of proportionality principle into FET is also somehow limiting host state‟s 
conduct.  Thus, Schill (2009, p.23) says that, “Although integrating proportionality into the 
principle of FET allows, to a certain extent, for a substantive control of host state conduct”. 
Further, he mentions that, “the proportionality requirement also clarifies that FET is not an 
inflexible standard, but allows for the balancing of the interest of host states and foreign 
investors”. Therefore, principle of proportionality and FET are intended to balancing two 
different conflicts of interest. 
FET is considered as backbone to the all bi-multilateral investments treaties. This was 
repeated in  CMS v Argentina  award and state that “there can be no doubt that a stable 
legal and business environment is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment”132. 
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Predictability and stability and consistency of the host State‟s legal framework has 
associated with FET
133
. 
 
FET can appear in two different ways, one is that it creates an autonomous, treaty based 
standards, and another is accordance with international law. The United States, France and 
the United Kingdom prefer the latter one
134
.  According to Dolzer and Schreuer, the FET is 
considered as a rule of international law, therefore, it cannot determine under the host state 
laws. The FET standard may be violated even if the investor receives the same treatment as 
national of the host state receives
135
.  Similarly, in Tecmed case tribunal understood that 
the FET was resulting from an autonomous interpretation, the text of Article 4(1) of the 
agreement according to its ordinary meaning (Article 31 (1) VCLT) or from international 
law and the good faith principle
136
. Likewise, Judge Schwebel defined FET as “fair and 
equitable treatment is a broad and widely-accepted standard encompassing such 
fundamental standards as good faith, due process, nondiscrimination, and 
proportionality”137. In MTD Chile 138case Tribunal observed that the ordinary meaning of 
the terms “fair” and “equitable” should mean “just”, “even-handed”, „unbiased”, 
„legitimate” 
There is a growing debate whether FET reflect the International law minimum standard of 
treatment which derives from customary international law. In Enron case tribunal stated 
that FET standard in the context of the BIT may be more precise than the customary 
international law minimum standard, and it could require a treatment additional to, or 
beyond that of, customary law
139
. In the Enron annulment case, Committee expressed FET 
in the BIT is not necessarily the same as the customary law minimum standard
140
.  
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Generally, in expropriation cases, it is difficult to establish that the expropriation has 
occurred without direct taking of property. Arbitral tribunals continuously address that the 
measures taken by host state must ensure transparency in the functioning of the public 
authorities and the lack of predictable framework for investment contrary to legitimate 
expectation of the investor and commitments made by the host state are considered as 
breaches of FET
141
.  Consequently, investment Tribunals has to determine whether host 
state‟s measures violate the FET. According to  Redferen (2004, paras11-25)  the standard 
may need to examine “the impact of the measures on the reasonable investment – backed 
expectations of the investor; and whether the state is attempting to avoid investment – 
backed expectations that state created or reinforced through its own acts”. Further, 
investor‟s behavior also should taken into account when analyzing FET standard, 
sometime, investor‟s conduct may induced to host state to act such a way. Thus, 
Sornarajah states in his study that the “[…] it is necessary to look into whether the claimant 
also was at fault and whether the respondent‟s conduct was a reaction to that fault”. 
Further, he says margin of appreciation has been discussed in the context of expropriation, 
necessity and fair and equitable standard. In addition, he also noted that there is an 
increasing acceptance that the examination of the measures taken by state should not be 
assessed too finely
142
.  
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Chapter IV: Role of ICSID Tribunals on Application of 
Proportionality 
 
This chapter mainly focuses the jurisdiction scope of the ICSID tribunals and how it 
attempts to balance between two different rights claims by applying principle of 
proportionality. 
 
4.1 Nature of ICSID Tribunal 
Normally, international responsibility and obligations are incurred when States become 
parties to an instrument of international law by signing and ratifying in accordance with 
their applicable domestic laws. Thus, many countries became party to the ICSID 
Convention by ratifying it. 
 
Today many bilateral, multilateral and regional treaties are concluded between States due 
to the growth of international economy across boundaries and specially these treaties 
contain itself the mechanism of dispute settlement, is the unique feature of these treaties. 
Thus, mostly investors would prefer to elect arbitration pursuant to the ICSID rules
143
. 
Until June 30, 2010, ICSID has registered 319 cases under ICSID Convention and 
Additional Facility Rules
144
.  ICSID Centre was established by the ICSID Convention
145
 
was concluded in 1965 under the auspices of the World Bank and is entered into force in 
1966
146
. ICSID is a public international organization and also is an institutional system of 
international arbitration that is specifically designed for investment disputes
147
.  The 
Convention mainly promotes and protects private foreign investment though providing 
favorable investment climate. It is clearly mentioned in the preamble to the ICSID 
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convention that the “Considering the need for international cooperation for economic 
development, and the role of private investment therein”  
Further, ICSID provides procedural framework for the disputes settlement rather than 
develop substantive rules for the protection of private foreign investment. The Procedural 
rules have provided by the ICSID Convention, Regulations and Rules and ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules
148
.  The substantive rules will be applied according to the 
agreement of the parties. If such applicable law fails to state, according to Article 42 of the 
convention, tribunal will apply the law of host state and applicable rules of international 
law
149
. Article 42 (1), reads as follows: 
“The Tribunal shall decide a dispute in accordance with such rules of law as 
may be agreed by the parties. In the absence of such agreement, the Tribunal 
shall apply the law of the Contracting State party to the dispute (including its 
rules on the conflict of laws) and such rules of international law as may be 
applicable‖. (Emphasis added) 
Article 42 reflects that arbitral tribunal is an autonomous forum which provides to parties 
to choose an applicable law. To invoke this neutral forum of ICSID arbitration, the host 
state and the contracting party of another the State should be signatory to the ICSID 
Convention. In the absence of such agreement investment dispute can be referred to ICSID 
Additional Facility pursuant to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules.  It is to note here that 
proceedings under the AF are not governed by ICSID Convention
150
.  
 
It is utmost important to define the jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunals, thus Article 25 of 
the Convention clearly provides the certain jurisdiction requirements.  Article 25, itself 
consists of four decisive factors. These factors have to be fulfilled by the claimant if he 
wants to choose ICSID Tribunal.  Article 25 reads as follows,  
―The jurisdiction of the center shall extend to any legal dispute arising directly 
out of an investment, between a Contracting State […] and a national of 
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another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing 
to submit to the Center. When the parties have given their consent, no party 
may withdraw its consent unilaterally‖ (Emphasis added).  
 
According to this Article, if an investor wants to challenge the host states acts or measures, 
he has to accomplish four jurisdictional requirements. Firstly, the dispute should be a legal 
dispute and should arise directly. On this point, host state‟s measures or action should have 
direct cause to particular investment in order to invoke ICSID jurisdiction. Measures may 
be a general or specific nature which might affect the foreign investment as well as 
domestic industries. Therefore, there is a room for host states to argue that the dispute 
could not arise directly from an investment in related to general economic measures. But, 
practice of arbitral tribunal is different.  They do not analyse whether measures are in 
general or specific nature, but analyze how far investor‟s right has infringed. This 
statement more evidenced by the recent awards of ICSID tribunals. Tribunals did not 
accept the arguments which put forwarded by Argentina, that the general nature of its 
measures were not affect on particular investment and those measures were designed to 
serve welfare of the people
151
(also see below Part 4.2).  
 
Secondly, dispute should arise ―………..out of an investment‖, although existence of 
investment is a central element to the Convention, it does not give any definition to the 
term „investment‟ or even not express what constitute an investment152. But, numbers of 
attempts were made to define investment, none of these were adopted. Therefore, the 
concept of investment may differ case to case, and it is left to parties to decide what they 
wanted to bring to the ICSID tribunal to resolve. 
 
Thirdly, parties should be contracting parties; it is another vital factor to invoke ICSID 
jurisdiction. Lastly, consent should be in writing. Consent of parties to the settlement is the 
cornerstone of the jurisdiction of the Center
153
. Convention does not require that the 
consent of both parties should be given in a single instrument
154
. Therefore, it is clear 
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consent need neither be made by use of particular wording nor in uniform instrument
155
. 
Contracting parties may give their consent to ICSID jurisdiction through BIT or 
multilateral treaties, invest contracts between the investor and the host state, and 
investment laws of the host state
156
. Thus, ICSID arbitral jurisdiction should be tested 
through two different sets of legal requirements. First, BIT jurisdiction should be met and 
second, ICSID Convention jurisdiction should be met.  Both sets of requirements perform 
a sort of double filter in order to confirm ICSID jurisdiction
157
. 
 
Once its consent is given, it cannot withdraw unilaterally from ICSID procedure
158
. Alcoa 
Minerals of Jamaica.INC v. Government of Jamaica
159
 is one of the first cases aroused 
under the convention
160
 regarding to the unilateral withdraw of ICSID jurisdiction.  In this 
case tribunal held that the consent to the ICSID jurisdiction was signed by the parties, 
when consent existed at the time the case was registered with ICSID. The notification of 
the reservation filed by Jamaica did not affect the prior consent
161
. Facts of this case as 
follows; 
 
United States and Jamaica became party to the ICSID Convention in 1966. At the 
time, according to Article 25 (4) of the Convention, Jamaica did not notify ICSID of 
any class or classes of dispute which Jamaica would not consider submitting to the 
jurisdiction of the Center. However, Jamaica notified ICSID that the investment 
dispute at ‗any time arising‘ which involved natural resources would not be submitted 
to ICSID arbitration, shortly before enactment of the Bauxite (Production Levy) . On 
this basis Jamaica argued thereby it was ousted of jurisdiction
162
.   
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Another exceptional feature of ICSID tribunal‟s award is binding nature163. It differs from 
other commercial arbitrations which required enforcement by a court judgment
164
. 
However, according to Article 52 of the Convention, the party against which award is 
rendered, believe that there is a procedural injustice arises, than that party can request for 
an annulment
165
. It is to note, in annulment proceedings under Convention, an ad hoc 
committee is not a court of appeal to consider the substance of the dispute, but can only 
determine whether the award should be annulled on one of the grounds in Article 52 (1)
166
. 
 
Therefore, the ICSID has always been considered to be more of a “court” than an “arbitral 
body” in the classics sense167 
There are many reasons for why arbitration does not generate precedent
168
. Although there 
is no doctrine of binding precedent in the ICSID arbitration system, the Committee 
considers that in the longer term it should develop a jurisprudence constanet in relation to 
annulment proceedings
169
 .  The tribunal agrees with the view expressed by the Argentine 
republic in the hearing on jurisdiction held in respect of this dispute, to the effect that the 
decisions of ICSID tribunals are not binding precedents and that every case must be 
examined in the light of its own circumstances
170
. Saipem Spa v. Bangladesh
171
, in this 
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case Tribunal noted, although tribunal is not bound by previous decisions, it must pay due 
consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals
172
.  According to these 
explanations, there is no explicit requirement that ICSID Tribunals bound by previous case 
law. However, considerable extent has given to earlier cases; for instance, Tecmed case has 
been quoted in several subsequent cases
173
. In that way, create a de facto doctrine of 
precedent.  
 
4.2 New Trend of ICSID Tribunals; after Tecmad v Mexico and 
subsequent cases 
 
Analyzes of proportionality principle also somehow became importance in the resolution 
of investment disputes which brought before ICSID tribunals. Tecmed SA V Mexico case is 
the starting point of proportionality analysis. Thereafter tribunal has discussed and applied 
proportionality principle in number of cases. This process had emerged largely during the 
Argentina economic crises and number of claims which claimed by investors brought 
before ICSID arbitration, such as, CMS v Argentina(2005), LG&E v Argentina(2006), 
Sampra v Argentina (2007), Continental Casualty v Argentina (2008), Enron v. Argentina 
(2007) and annulment decisions in respective of CMS and Enron in 2010. In these cases, 
Argentina pleaded the „necessity‟ defense according to provisions of the BIT174 and 
customary international law. 
 
In Tecmed case, dispute involved between Tecmed SA, a company incorporated in Spain 
and United Mexican State (Mexico)
175. The dispute concerned Mexico‟s denial to renew 
license pursuant to operation of hazardous waste Landfill through its resolution dated 
November 25, 1998 (Resolution). The claim was based on the BIT (Spain-Mexico BIT) for 
alleged violations by Mexico of the BIT provisions regarding expropriation, FET and full 
protection and security. Denial of permit of license can deprive them from any economical 
value. It could be de facto indirect expropriation. Respondent states that the Resolution 
was a regularity measure issued in compliance with the State‟s police power within the 
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highly regulated and extremely sensitive framework of environmental protection and 
public health. Thus, Respondent alleges that the Resolution is a legitimate action of the 
State which does not amount to an expropriation under international law
176
. Further, 
community‟s opposition and aggressive also had happened in different times177.  
 
In this case, the tribunal observed that the regulatory measures could be enclosed 
comparable characteristic of indirect expropriation when there was lack of proportionality 
between the measures and the right of investor which bound to protect through investment 
laws or treaties. Arbitral tribunal analyzed the proportionality principle based on ECHR 
cases and states as follows; 
‗ [..] the Arbitral Tribunal will consider, in order to determine if they are to be 
characterized as expropriatory, whether such actions or measures are 
proportional to the public interest presumably protected thereby and to the 
protection legally granted to investments, taking into account that the 
significance of such impact has a key role upon deciding the 
proportionality‘.178 
According to tribunal‟s analyses, investor‟s expectation plays a central role in the 
expropriation analysis. In this case, I feel that the tribunal has given equal weight to each 
and every elements of proportionality principle rather, it observed whether measures 
proportional to investors rights. Thus, Weiler found that “the Tecmed proportionality rule 
is analogous to the approach of WTO penal in applying the health exception to liability 
contained in Ar. XX (g) of the GATT. […] the burden of proof shifts to the respondent 
opportunity to demonstrate that the disputed measures was narrowly suit a compelling 
public interest”179. 
In 2001-2002 a financial crisis erupted in Argentina and this can be considered as one of 
the worst ever worldwide economic crisis. To overcome this situation Argentina has 
adopted a number of measures which severely affected foreign investments.   
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In recent Argentina cases CMS, LE&G, Enron and Sempra involved US Corporations and 
Argentina pursuant to the U.S - Argentine BIT. in LG&E case Argentina pleads its defense 
as a “state of necessity”, available under Argentine law, treaty in Articles XI and IV (3) as 
well as customary international law
180
 and Tribunal applied less restrictive approach to 
assess the Argentina‟s financial crisis. In this respect, Argentina argued that the Article XI 
of the US-Argentina BIT included a non-precluded measures (NPM) clause, which permits 
parties to take necessary actions to protect essential security interest.  And it further argues 
this is a self-judging provision, that it is for the State to make a good faith determination as 
to what measures are necessary for the maintenance of public order, or the protection of its 
essential security interests
181
. However, based on the evidence before tribunal, it decided 
and concluded that the provision is not self-judging
182
.  Tribunal failed to take into account 
NPM clause when interpreting the necessary requirements. Rather, Tribunals were 
depended on customary law requirements of necessity to analyse and requested Argentina 
to show that the actions it took were the „only way‟ available183. But in LE & G, 
Continental Casualty case tribunals took different approach to the NPM clause and gave 
considerable deference to Argentina‟s determination that its actions were necessary to 
protect essential security interest and maintain public order
184
. 
In this case Tribunal relied on some extent to the principle of proportionality and it refers 
as follows: “With respect to the power of the State to adopt its policies, it can generally be 
said that the State has the right to adopt measures having a social or general welfare 
purpose. In such case, the measure must be accepted without any imposition of liability, 
except in cases where the State‟s action is obviously disproportionate to the need being 
addressed”185. However, arbitrators did not develop their findings according to the 
proportionality principle.  The concept of proportionality principle also deserve by the 
Respondent in CMS v. Argentina, argued that the measures adopted were reasonable and 
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proportional to the objective pursued
186
.  In these case Tribunals analyses the requirements 
of necessity which put forwarded by Argentina in the light of US-Argentina BIT and 
Customary international law. 
After analyzing Argentina‟s economic crisis LG&E Tribunal found that Argentina is 
excused under Article XI from liability for any breaches of the treaty between December 
2001 and 26 April 2003
187
. But Tribunal did not engage in serious proportionality analysis 
to the Argentine response to the crisis
188
. However, in these cases much discussed the 
measures have taken by Argentina whether it necessary to the present crisis. Tribunals did 
not focus whether those measures were suitable to achieve desired objectives.  
 Further, in LG&E case, Tribunal also discussed the “state of necessity” or “state of 
emergency”. Thus, Tribunal concluded by satisfying the Articles XI of the US – Argentina 
BIT and Ar. 25 of the ILC Draft Article, Argentina exclude from its liability vis-à-vis the 
damage caused as a result of the measures adopted to response to the severe crises
189
.  In 
contrast, in Enron case tribunal found that the requirements of this provision was not 
satisfied; particularly the measures adopted by Argentina were not the “only way” 
available to Argentina to achieve the result. Therefore, Argentina had itself contributed to 
the state of necessity
190
. Further, Tribunal asserted that it did not have duty to find 
alternative measures that Argentina should have adopted.  In this regard Tribunal did not 
apply Ar. 25 (1) (a) of the ILC Articles, but applied an expert opinion on an economic 
issue. Thus, the Annulment Committee found that this was amounts to failure to apply the 
applicable law
191
.  
Further, it stated that Tribunal did not address a number of issues that are essential to the 
question of whether the „only way” requirement was met. Such, (i) question concerning the 
legal definition of the expression “only way” in Ar. 25(1) (a) of the ILC Articles. The 
Committee found several interpretations; one potential interpretation is its literal meaning 
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that Argentina has no other measures to adopt to address the economic crisis
192
. Another 
possible interpretation is, there must be no alternative measures that the State might have 
taken for safeguarding the essential interest in question that did not involve a similar or 
graver breach of international law
193
 . The Committee further states that the principle of 
necessity will only be precluded if there is an alternative that would not involve a breach of 
international law or which would involve a less grave breach of international law
194
. (ii) 
Effectiveness of alternative measures, for instance, State might have two alternative 
measures in order to safeguard an essential interest. From these two measures, one measure 
is more appropriate and more effective, at the same time it would be inconsistent with 
obligations of the State under international law. The second measure is less appropriate and 
less effective but not inconsistent.  If the State adopted the former measure, would be 
precluded from invoking the principle of necessity, on the basis that there was an 
alternative available? Otherwise, could the State claim that the measure taken was the 
“only way” that stood a very high chance of being very effective?195 (iii) Who makes the 
decision whether there is a relevant alternative, and in accordance with what test? In these 
three questions Tribunal (in Enron case) did not address second and third questions.  
Furthermore, Enron Annulment Committee stated that  it was not to provide answer for 
these question but it was necessary for the Tribunal, either expressly or silently, to decide 
or assume the answer in order to apply the “only way” provision of Ar. 25 (1) (a) to the 
facts of this case
196
.  
In this Enron Annulment award, Committee found several other issues which were not 
address properly by the Enron tribunal. For instance, tribunal held that Argentina 
“contributed to the situation of necessity‟ within the meaning of Ar. 25(2)(b) of the ILC 
Articles, Annulment Committee state that Enron Tribunal  did not adopt literal 
interpretation when interpret Ar. 25 (2)(b)  and it say that the conduct of a State 
contributing to a situation of necessity for purpose  of above Ar. of the ILC must be 
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conduct constituting some sort of “fault” on the part of the State197. Along with other issue, 
Committee has annulled that the Tribunal‟s decision on Argentina is precluded from 
relaying on principle of necessity under customary international law
198
.   
In Continental Casualty award tribunal explicitly adopted the WTO‟s least restrictive 
alternative approach, thus, it moves from the “no other means available” standard. In this 
regard Tribunal stated that the text of Article XI derives from the parallel model clause of 
the US FNC treaties and these treaties in turn reflect the formulation of Art. XX of the 
GATT 1947. Therefore, it found referring to the GATT and WTO case law were more 
appropriate, rather than to refer customary international law to dealt with concept and 
requirements of necessity
199
.  
In this case, Tribunal has reviewed standard of application according to the criteria of the 
principle of proportionality and applied cumulatively. In this way, Tribunal assessed 
whether measure contributed to the realization of their legitimacy aims under Ar. XI of the 
BIT, thus it applied “suitability test”  whether measure choose and did  make a decisive 
contribution to the end
200
.  Next, Tribunal analyzed “necessity test” by applying standard 
of review such as Argentina had reasonably available alternative, less in conflict or more 
complaint with its international obligation. Tribunal has examined all relevant Argentina‟s 
measures to evaluate whether Argentina has a “reasonably available alternatives”201.  
Hence, tribunal developed its argument by comparing the Argentina‟s policies between 
“pre-emptive” policies and measure at issue and found that possibility of  reasonability 
available alternative  considered too tenuous and rendered these measures unnecessary 
under Ar. XI. Thus it applied last step of proportionality principle criteria
202
. 
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4.3 Balancing different conflicts of interest 
The real sense of principle of proportionality is to find a balance between two different 
right claims, thus tribunal apply proportionality because of its scope and flexibility allows 
arbitrators to see entire contractual field
203
. However, it is doubtful how far ICSID 
tribunals have utilized this balancing principle effectively.  
Takahashi (2001, p.14) expresses that the principle of proportionality is inherent in 
evaluating the right of an individual person and the general public interest of society. This 
means that a fair or reasonable balance must be attained between two countervailing 
interests.  Further, the measures adopted by host states do not only pursue a legitimate 
objective but it also must maintain a fair balance between the demands of the general 
community and the requirements of the protection of the private individual‟s fundamental 
rights 
. To achieve this objective ICSID Tribunals also have adopted various requirement criteria 
based on different jurisprudence. According to above mentioned cases, ICSID tribunals 
have applied proportionality in numerous ways. However, Enron Annulment case, the 
Committee placed three questions to determine the requirements of “only way” according 
to ILC Draft Article. Thus, it reflects Tribunals are in a position to carefully scrutinize the 
host states‟ measures especially when they have taken to protect essential interest of the 
public. Therefore, in these cases Tribunals suggested that during urgent situations, crisis, 
need or social emergencies should be weighed against the deprivation of the use and 
enjoyment of the claimants‟ investment. In this regard, the host state‟s measure must be 
evaluated based on benefit of the measure, value and control of investors‟ right.  
 
Balancing in the different interest is somehow difficult task. Tribunals has to examine the 
whole scenario of the investment and it also very important to evaluate the loss that of 
investor has undergone due to State measures or actions, and to determine whether 
compensation is required or not.   This is further confirmed by the statement of Stone 
Sweet (2010, p 3) who explains as “more generally, balancing provides flexibility, 
enabling judges to adapt decisions to facts ([]), and to fashion equitable judgments, 
reducing the losses of the loser as much as possible”. Proportionality embraces balancing. 
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In LE&G case Tribunal anyhow tries to balance and it held that the Argentina was excused 
from liability in certain period.  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
The main aim of this research is to identify whether application of principle of 
proportionality is one of the preferred methods of balancing between two different 
conflicts of interests in investment dispute settlement process. Recently, ICSID Tribunals 
applied principle of proportionality to challenge host states‟ regulatory measures which has 
gained importance now. 
Initially, foreign investment contracts are mostly concluded as a long-term cross border 
investment and modern investment treaties are tailored to face unexpected non commercial 
risks. Host states‟ interference is one of the main perils in peaceful investment journey. 
Generally, investment contract are made between State and a national/company/enterprise 
of the other State. As part of the State duty it has to bring a number of measures in 
accordance with changing circumstances. Some of these are not identified as direct or 
indirect means of interference of property right of the investor. Deprivation of enjoyment 
of property rights of investor is the central factor to determine whether indirect 
expropriation has occurred. ICSID Tribunals have generally accepted that the host states 
have right to regulate its economy through number of measures and obvisiouly in some 
instance they have accepted that they do not have power to examine the host states‟ 
measures whether they right or wrong. However, it requires that host states should respect 
the existence of legitimate expectation of the investors.  
Further, host state has obligation not to violate specific commitments which were given by 
at the entry of foreign investment through its bi-multilateral treaties i.e. minimum standard 
of treatment, FET, security, special incentives, non discriminatory treatment etc. Investors 
also should be expected some foreseeable events during its long duration of investment. 
Thus, Investment treaties should be formulated prudently and risks could be allocated 
advancelly by express wording. Normally, investment treaties contain a clause which 
explicitly expresses the state of emergency/state of necessity and how state reacts or 
response to those situations. Commonly, investment treaties are contained a non-precluded 
clause which limit the applicability of investor protections under the treaty in exceptional 
situation. ICSID tribunal should give alive to this clause and investor has to bear 
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consequences of host state measures related to protection of essential interest of the State. In 
CMS, Enron Sempra awards tribunals found that the NPM clause was inapplicable. Further,  
in LG&E award tribunal found that the clause was properly invoke and Argentina‟s liability 
precluded for specified period of the crisis. 
Furthermore, proportionality principle also considered as an important device for judges to 
check the regulatory measures of the governments. It can be said that proportionality 
principle as the suitable principle to apply in investment disputes. Because, it involves two 
different conflicts of interest i.e. public interest and individual rights. ICSID tribunals 
applied this principle based on other jurisdiction such as ECHR and WTO.  Significantly, 
these different jurisdictions in certain level allow Member States to adopt measures 
pertaining to safeguard its essential interests. When ICSID tribunals interpret treaty 
provision, tribunals have given importance to other laws which dealt with necessity 
requirements i.e. customary international law and WTO standard of review rather giving 
importance to NPM provision. Therefore, the application of the principle of proportionality 
in its more rigorous forms might be criticized on the ground that goes beyond the judicial 
function. 
In addition, ICSID Tribunals has followed principle of proportionality on numerous 
jurisdictions i.e. in Tecmed case tribunal applied the proportionality principle based on 
ECHR case law. In Enron Case Tribunal has applied “the only way for the State to 
safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril” requirement based on 
Ar. 25 of the ILC Draft Articles, while Continental Causality case Tribunal assessed 
“reasonably available alternative measures” based on WTO law. Therefore, in ICSID 
Tribunal does not have a clear picture of principle of proportionality on which standard of 
review should it follow?. Applying different approaches of standard of review may lead to 
more confusion as stated by Bruke-White and Staden. Therefore, it needs some flexible 
approach, and cannot be defined definite rule since it is depended on case by case analysis.  
 
Along this way, judges apply general principles of international law to interpret treaty 
provisions on the standard of treatments to find a justifiable solution. Commonly, 
investment contracts include rights and duties of contracting parties. At the same time it 
prevents from unjust enrichment by one party of the contract and secure acquired rights of 
investor.  
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Finally, it can be said that principle of proportionality is one of the appropriate principles to 
apply in investment disputes as stated by Stone Sweet. Tribunal must apply this principle to 
balance two different rights claims as it has to protect the loser of one side. According to my 
observation, investment disputes involve State and private party. Two different sets of legal 
norms (State-sovereign right on enact, alter, and abolish laws, and regulations; and investor-
property rights including use and enjoyment) arise along with disputes that ICSID tribunal 
should be given equal weight when settling disputes. Therefore, I assume that ICSID 
tribunal still lack on fundamental balancing of values and interest between contracting 
parties.  
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Appendix -1. 
US – Argentina BIT – Treaty between United States of America and the Argentine 
Republic Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of 
Investment- November 14, 1991 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TREATY BETWEEN 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND 
THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC 
CONCERNING THE RECIPROCAL ENCOURAGEMENT 
AND PROTECTION OF INVESTMENT  
Signed November 14, 1991; Entered into Force October 20, 1994 
The United States of America and the Argentine Republic, hereinafter referred to as 
the Parties; 
Desiring to promote greater economic cooperation between them, with respect to 
investment by nationals and companies of one Party in the territory of the other Party; 
Recognizing that agreement upon the treatment to be accorded such investment will 
stimulate the flow of private capital and the economic development of the Parties; 
Agreeing that fair and equitable treatment of investment is desirable in order to 
maintain a stable framework for investment and maximum effective use of economic 
resources; 
Recognizing that the development of economic and business ties can contribute to 
the well-being of workers in both Parties and promote respect for internationally 
recognized worker rights; and 
having resolved to conclude a Treaty concerning the encouragement and reciprocal 
protection of investment;  
Have agreed as follows: 
ARTICLE I 
1. For the purposes of this Treaty, 
a) "investment" means every kind of investment in the territory of one Party owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of the other Party, such as 
equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and includes without limitation: 
(i) tangible and intangible property, including rights, such as mortgages, liens and 
pledges; 
(ii) a company or shares of stock or other interests in a company or interests in the 
assets thereof;  
(iii) a claim to money or a claim to performance having economic value and directly 
related to an investment;  
(iv) intellectual property which includes, inter alia, rights relating to: literary and artistic 
works, including sound recordings, inventions in all fields of human endeavor, 
industrial designs, semiconductor mask works, trade secrets, know-how, and 
confidential business information, and trademarks, service marks, and trade names; 
and 
(v) any right conferred by law or contract, and any licenses and permits pursuant to 
law; 
b) "company" of a Party means any kind of corporation, company, association, state 
enterprise, or other organization, legally constituted under the laws and regulations of 
a Party or a political subdivision thereof whether or not organized for pecuniary gain, 
and whether privately or governmentally owned; 
c) "national" of a Party means a natural person who is a national of a Party under its 
applicable law;  
d) "return" means an amount derived from or associated with an investment, 
including profit; dividend; interest; capita gain; royalty payment; management, 
technical assistance or other fee; or returns in kind; 
e) "associated activities" include the organization, control, operation, maintenance 
and disposition of companies, branches, agencies, offices, factories or other facilities 
for the conduct of business; the making, performance and enforcement of contracts; 
the acquisition, use, protection and disposition of property of all kinds including 
intellectual and industrial property rights; and the borrowing of funds, the purchase, 
issuance, and sale of equity shares and other securities, and the purchase of foreign 
exchange for imports. 
f) "territory" means the territory of the United States or the Argentine Republic, 
including the territorial sea established in accordance with international law as 
reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. This Treaty 
also applies in the seas and seabed adjacent to the territorial sea in which the United 
States or the Argentine Republic has sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance 
with international law as reflected in the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law 
of the Sea. 
2. Each Party reserves the right to deny to any company of the other Party the 
advantages of this Treaty if (a) nationals of any third country, or nationals of such 
Party, control such company and the company has no substantial business activities 
in the territory of the other Party, or (b) the company is controlled by nationals of a 
third country with which the denying Party does not maintain normal economic 
relations. 
3. Any alteration of the form in which assets are invested or reinvested shall not 
affect their character as investment.  
ARTICLE II  
 
1. Each Party shall permit and treat investment, and activities associated therewith, 
on a basis no less favorable than that accorded in like situations to investment or 
associated activities of its own nationals or companies, or of nationals or companies 
of any third country, whichever is the more favorable, subject to the right of each 
Party to make or maintain exceptions falling within one of the sectors or matters listed 
in the Protocol to this Treaty. Each Party agrees to notify the other Party before or on 
the date of entry into force of this Treaty of all such laws and regulations of which it is 
aware concerning the sectors or matters listed in the Protocol. Moreover, each Party 
agrees to notify the other of any future exception with respect to the sectors or 
matters listed in the Protocol, and to limit such exceptions to a minimum. Any future 
exception by either Party shall not apply to investment existing in that sector or 
matter at the time the exception becomes effective. The treatment accorded pursuant 
to any exceptions shall, unless specified otherwise in the Protocol, be not less 
favorable than that accorded in like situations to investments and associated 
activities of nationals or companies of any third country.  
 
2. a) Investment shall at all times be accorded fair and equitable treatment, shall 
enjoy full protection and security and shall in no case be accorded treatment less 
than that required by international law.  
 
b) Neither Party shall in any way impair by arbitrary or discriminatory measures the 
management, operation, maintenance, use, enjoyment, acquisition, expansion, or 
disposal of investments. For the purposes of dispute resolution under Articles VII and 
VIII, a measure may be arbitrary or discriminatory notwithstanding the opportunity to 
review such measure in the courts or administrative tribunals of a Party.  
 
c) Each Party shall observe any obligation it may have entered into with regard to 
investments.  
 
3. Subject to the laws relating to the entry and sojourn of aliens, nationals of either 
Party shall be permitted to enter and to remain in the territory of the other Party for 
the purpose of establishing, developing, administering or advising on the operation of 
an investment to which they, or a company of the first Party that employs them, have 
committed or are in the process of committing a substantial amount of capital or other 
resources.  
 
4. Companies which are legally constituted under the applicable laws or regulations 
of one Party, and which are investments, shall be permitted to engage top 
managerial personnel of their choice, regardless of nationality.  
 
5. Neither Party shall impose performance requirements as a condition of 
establishment, expansion or maintenance of investments, which require or enforce 
commitments to export goods produced, or which specify that goods or services must 
be purchased locally, or which impose any other similar requirements.  
 
6. Each Party shall provide effective means of asserting claims and enforcing rights 
with respect to investments, investment agreements, and investment authorizations.  
 
7. Each Party shall make public all laws, regulations, administrative practices and 
procedures, and adjudicatory decisions that pertain to or affect investments.  
 
8. The treatment accorded by the United States of America to investments and 
associated activities of nationals and companies of the Argentine Republic under the 
provisions of this Article shall in any State, Territory or possession of the United 
States of America be no less favorable than the treatment accorded therein to 
investments and associated activities of nationals of the United States of America 
resident in, and companies legally constituted under the laws and regulations of, 
other States, Territories or possessions of the United States of America.  
 
9. The most favored nation provisions of this Article shall not apply to advantages 
accorded by either Party to nationals or companies of any third country by virtue of 
that Party's binding obligations that derive from full membership in a regional 
customs union or free trade area, whether such an arrangement is designated as a 
customs union, free trade area, common market or otherwise.  
 
ARTICLE III  
 
This Treaty shall not preclude either Party from prescribing laws and regulations in 
connection with the admission of investments made in its territory by nationals or 
companies of the other Party or with the conduct of associated activities, provided, 
however, that such laws and regulations shall not impair the substance of any of the 
rights set forth in this Treaty.  
 
ARTICLE IV  
 
1. Investments shall not be expropriated or nationalized either directly or indirectly 
through measures tantamount to expropriation or nationalization ('expropriation-) 
except for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; upon payment of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation; and in accordance with due process 
of law and the general principles of treatment provided for in Article II (2) 
Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated 
investment immediately before the expropriatory action was taken or became known, 
whichever is earlier; be paid without delay; include interest at a commercially 
reasonable rate from the date of expropriation; be fully realizable; and be freely 
transferable at the prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of expropriation.  
 
2. A national or company of either Party that asserts that all or part of its investment 
has been expropriated shall have a right to prompt review by the appropriate judicial 
or administrative authorities of the other Party to determine whether any such 
expropriation has occurred and, if so, whether such expropriation, and any 
compensation therefore, conforms to the provisions of this Treaty and the principles 
of international law.  
 
3. Nationals or companies of either Party whose investments suffer losses in the 
territory of the other Party owing to war or other armed conflict, revolution, state of 
national emergency, insurrection, civil disturbance or other similar events shall be 
accorded treatment by such other Party no less favorable than that accorded to its 
own nationals or companies or to nationals or companies of any third country, 
whichever is the more favorable treatment, as regards any measures it adopts in 
relation to such losses.  
 
ARTICLE V  
 
1. Each Party shall permit all transfers related to an investment to be made freely and 
without delay into and out of its territory. Such transfers include: (a) returns; (b) 
compensation pursuant to Article IV; (c) payments arising out of an investment 
dispute; (d) payments made under a contract, including amortization of principal and 
accrued interest payments made pursuant to a loan agreement directly related to an 
investment; (e) proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of an 
investment; and (f) additional contributions to capital for the maintenance or 
development of an investment.  
 
2. Except as provided in Article IV paragraph 1, transfers shall be made in a freely 
usable currency at the prevailing market rate of exchange on the date of transfer with 
respect to spot transactions in the currency to be transferred. The free transfer shall 
take place in accordance with the procedures established by each Party; such 
procedures shall not impair the rights set forth in this Treaty.  
 
3. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, either Party may maintain 
laws and regulations (a) requiring reports of currency transfer; and (b) imposing 
income taxes by such means as a withholding tax applicable to dividends or other 
transfers. Furthermore, either Party may protect the rights of creditors, or ensure the 
satisfaction of judgments in adjudicatory proceedings, through the equitable, 
nondiscriminatory and good faith application of its law.  
 
ARTICLE VI  
 
The Parties agree to consult promptly, on the request of either, to resolve any 
disputes in connection with the Treaty, or to discuss any matter relating to the 
interpretation or application of the Treaty.  
 
ARTICLE VII 
1. For purposes of this Article, an investment dispute is a dispute between a Party 
and a national or company of the other Party arising out of or relating to (a) an 
investment agreement between that Party and such national or company; (b) an 
investment authorization granted by that Party's foreign investment authority (if any 
such authorization exists) to such national or company; or (c) an alleged breach of 
any right conferred or created by this Treaty with respect to an investment. 
2. In the event of an investment dispute, the parties to the dispute should initially 
seek a resolution through consultation and negotiation. If the dispute cannot be 
settled amicably, the national or company concerned may choose to submit the 
dispute for resolution: 
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Party that is a party to the dispute; 
or  
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute-settlement 
procedures; or  
(c) in accordance with the terms of paragraph 3.  
3. (a) Provided that the national or company concerned has not submitted the dispute 
for resolution under paragraph 2 (a) or (b) and that six months have elapsed from the 
date on which the dispute arose, the national or company concerned may choose to 
consent in writing to the submission of the dispute for settlement by binding 
arbitration:  
(i) to the International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes ("Centre") 
established by the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between 
States and Nationals of other States, done at Washington, March 18, 1965 ("ICSID 
Convention"), provided that the Party is a party to such convention: or  
(ii) to the Additional Facility of the Centre, if the Centre is not available; or  
(iii) in accordance with the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNICTRAL): or  
(iv) to any other arbitration institution, or in accordance with any other arbitration 
rules, as may be mutually agreed between the parties to the dispute.  
(b) Once the national or company concerned has so consented, either party to the 
dispute may initiate arbitration in accordance with the choice so specified in the 
consent.  
4. Each Party hereby consents to the submission of any investment dispute for 
settlement by binding arbitration in accordance with the choice specified in the written 
consent of the national or company under paragraph 3. Such consent, together with 
the written consent of the national or company when given under paragraph 3 shall 
satisfy the requirement for:  
(a) written consent of the parties to the dispute for purposes of Chapter II of the 
ICSID Convention (Jurisdiction of the Centre) and for purposes of the Additional 
Facility Rules; and  
(b) an "agreement in writing" for purposes of Article II of the United Nations 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done at 
New York, June 10, 1958 ("New York Convention").  
5. Any arbitration under paragraph 3(a)(ii), (iii) or (iv) of this Article shall be held in a 
state that is a party to the New York Convention.  
6. Any arbitral award rendered pursuant to this Article shall be final and binding on 
the parties to the dispute. Each Party undertakes to carry out without delay the 
provisions of any such award and to provide in its territory for its enforcement.  
7. In any proceeding involving an investment dispute, a Party shall not assert, as a 
defense, counterclaim, right of set-off or otherwise, that the national or company 
concerned has received or will receive, pursuant to an insurance or guarantee 
contract, indemnification or other compensation for all or part of its alleged damages.  
8. For purposes of an arbitration held under paragraph 3 of this Article, any company 
legally constituted under the applicable laws and regulations of a Party or a political 
subdivision thereof but that, immediately before the occurrence of the event or events 
giving rise to the dispute, was an investment of nationals or companies of the other 
Party, shall be treated as a national or company of such other Party in accordance 
with Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.  
 
ARTICLE VIII 
1. Any dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the 
Treaty which is not resolved through consultations or other diplomatic channels, shall 
be submitted, upon the request of either Party, to an arbitral tribunal for binding 
decision in accordance with the applicable rules of international law. In the absence 
of an agreement by the Parties to the contrary, the arbitration rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), except to the extent 
modified by the Parties or by the arbitrators, shall govern.  
2. Within two months of receipt of a request, each Party shall appoint an arbitrator. 
The two arbitrators shall select a third arbitrator as Chairman, who is a national of a 
third State. The UNCITRAL Rules for appointing members of three member panels 
shall apply mutatis mutandis to the appointment of the arbitral panel except that the 
appointing authority referenced in those rules shall be the Secretary General of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration.  
3. Unless otherwise agreed, all submissions shall be made and all hearings shall be 
completed within six months of the date of selection of the third arbitrator, and the 
Tribunal shall render its decisions within two months of the date of the final 
submissions or the date of the closing of the hearings, whichever is later.  
4. Expenses incurred by the Chairman, the other arbitrators, and other costs of the 
proceedings shall be paid for equally by the Parties.  
ARTICLE IX  
The provisions of Article VII and VIII shall not apply to a dispute arising (a) under the 
export credit, guarantee or insurance programs of the Export-Import Bank of the 
United States or (b) under other official credit, guarantee or insurance arrangements 
pursuant to which the Parties have agreed to other means of settling disputes. 
ARTICLE X 
This Treaty shall not derogate from:  
(a) laws and regulations, administrative practices or procedures, or administrative or 
adjudicatory decisions of either Party; 
(b) international legal obligations; or  
(c) obligations assumed by either Party, including those contained in an investment 
agreement or an investment authorization,  
that entitle investments or associated activities to treatment more favorable than that 
accorded by this Treaty in like situations.  
ARTICLE XI 
This Treaty shall not preclude the application by either Party of measures necessary 
for the maintenance of public order, the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace or security, or the Protection of its 
own essential security interests.  
ARTICLE XII 
1. With respect to its tax policies, each Party should strive to accord fairness and 
equity in the treatment of investment of nationals and companies of the other Party.  
2. Nevertheless, the provisions of this Treaty, and in particular Article VII and VIII, 
shall apply to matters of taxation only with respect to the following:  
(a) expropriation, pursuant to Article IV;  
(b) transfers, pursuant to Article V; or  
(c) the observance and enforcement of terms of an investment agreement or 
authorization as referred to in Article VII(l)(a) or (b),  
to the extent they are not subject to the dispute settlement provisions of a Convention 
for the avoidance of double taxation between the two Parties, or have been raised 
under such settlement provisions and are not resolved within a reasonable period of 
time.  
ARTICLE XIII 
This Treaty shall apply to the political subdivisions of the Parties.  
 
ARTICLE XIV 
1. This Treaty shall enter into force thirty days after the date of exchange of 
instruments of ratification. It shall remain in force for a period of ten years and shall 
continue in force unless terminated in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Article. It 
shall apply to investments existing at the time of entry into force as well as to 
investments made or acquired thereafter.  
2. Either Party may, by giving one year's written notice to the other Party, terminate 
this Treaty at the end of the initial ten year period or at any time thereafter.  
3. With respect to investments made or acquired prior to the date of termination of 
this Treaty and to which this Treaty otherwise applies, the provisions of all of the 
other Articles of this Treaty shall thereafter continue to be effective for a further 
period of ten years from such date of termination.  
4. The Protocol shall form an integral part of the Treaty.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the respective plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.  
DONE in duplicate at Washington on the fourteenth day of November, 1991, in the 
English and Spanish languages, both texts being equally authentic.  
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: 
FOR THE ARGENTINE REPUBLIC:  
PROTOCOL 
1. During dispute settlement proceedings pursuant to Article VII, a party may be 
required to produce evidence of ownership or control consistent with Article I(l)(a).  
2. With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right to 
make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment in the following sectors:  
air transportation; ocean and coastal shipping; banking; insurance; energy and power 
production; custom house brokers; ownership and operation of broadcast or common 
carrier radio and television stations; ownership of real property; ownership of shares 
in the Communications Satellite Corporation; the provision of common carrier 
telephone and telegraph services; the provision of submarine cable services; use of 
land and natural resources  
3. With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right to 
make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment with respect to certain 
programs involving government grants, loans, and insurance.  
4. With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the United States reserves the right to 
make or maintain limited exceptions to national and most favored nation treatment in 
the following sectors, with respect to which treatment will be based on reciprocity:  
mining on the public domain; maritime services and maritime-related services; 
primary dealership in United States government securities.  
5. With reference to Article II, paragraph 1, the Argentine Republic reserves the right 
to make or maintain limited exceptions to national treatment in the following sectors:  
real estate in the Border Areas; air transportation; shipbuilding; nuclear energy 
centers; uranium mining; insurance; mining; fishing.  
6. The Parties understand that, with respect to rights reserved in Article XI of the 
Treaty, "obligations with respect to the maintenance or restoration of international 
peace or security" means obligations under the Charter of the United Nations.  
7. The Parties acknowledge and agree that, to the extent of any conflict or 
inconsistency between the terms of this Treaty, and the terms of the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation between the Parties, entered into force 
December 20, 1854 (the "FCN Treaty-), the terms of this Treaty shall supersede the 
terms of the FCN Treaty, and shall control the resolution of such conflict.  
8. The Parties confirm their mutual understanding that the provisions of this Treaty do 
not bind either Party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation 
which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of this Treaty.  
9. Notwithstanding Article II(5) and in accordance with the terms of this paragraph, 
the Government of the Argentine Republic may maintain, but not intensify, existing 
performance requirements in the automotive industry. The Government of the 
Argentine Republic shall exert best efforts to eliminate all such requirements within 
the shortest possible period, and shall ensure their elimination within eight years of 
the date of the entry into force of this Treaty. The Government of the Argentine 
Republic shall further ensure that such performance requirements are applied in a 
manner which does not place existing investments at a competitive disadvantage 
against new entrants in this industry. The Parties shall consult at the request of either 
on any matter concerning the implementation of these undertakings. For the 
purposes of this paragraph, "existing" means extant at the time of signature of this 
Treaty.  
10. The Parties note that the Argentine Republic has had and may have in the future 
a debt-equity conversion program under which nationals or companies of the United 
States may choose to invest in the Argentine Republic through the purchase of debt 
at a discount.  
The Parties agree that the rights provided in Article V, paragraph 1, with respect to 
the transfer of returns and of proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part of 
an investment, remain or may be, as such rights would apply to that part of an 
investment financed through a debt-equity conversion, modified by the terms of any 
debt-equity conversion agreement between a national or company of the United 
States and the Government of the Argentine Republic, or any agency or 
instrumentality thereof.  
The transfer of returns and of proceeds from the sale or liquidation of all or any part 
of an investment shall in no case be on terms less favorable than those accorded, in 
like circumstances, to nationals or companies of the Argentine Republic or any third 
country, whichever is more favorable.  
11. The Parties note with satisfaction that the Argentine Republic is engaged in a 
process of privatization of various industries, including public utilities. They agree that 
they will undertake their best efforts, including through consultations, to avoid any 
misinterpretation regarding the scope of Article II(5) that would adversely affect this 
privatization process.  
Embassy of the United States of America 
Buenos Aires, August 24, 1992 
No. 453 
Mr. Minister: 
I have the honor to refer to the Treaty between the United States of America and the 
Argentine Republic concerning the reciprocal encouragement and protection of 
investment, with Protocol signed at Washington, November 14, 1991 ("The Treaty"). 
During the negotiation of the Treaty, the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Argentine Republic discussed the inclusion in Section 5 
of the Protocol to the Treaty of the Argentine Mining Sector. Based on those 
discussions and subsequent discussions regarding this matter, I wish to propose the 
deletion of the term "Mining" from the list of sectors in Section 5 of the Protocol. 
If the foregoing is acceptable to your Government, I have the honor to propose that 
this note, together with your reply to that effect shall constitute an agreement 
between the two Governments amending the Treaty, which shall be subject to 
ratification. 
Accept, Mr. Minister, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration. 
Dr. Guido Di Tella, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, 
Buenos Aires. 
 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
OFFICE OF LANGUAGE SERVICES 
Translating Division 
LS No. 140114 
LM  
SPA/ENG  
Minister of Foreign Relations and Worship 
Buenos Aires, November 6, 1992 
Mr. Ambassador: 
I have the honor to address you with regard to your note dated August 24, 1992, 
which reads as follows: 
[The Spanish translation of Ambassador Todman’s note of August 24, 1992, agrees 
in all substantive respects with the original English text.] 
In that regard I wish to state that my Government agrees with the terms of the 
transcribed note and, therefore, I have the honor to inform you that the aforesaid note 
and this reply constitute an agreement between out two Governments that will enter 
into force open the exchange of instruments of ratification. 
Accept, Sir, the assurances of my highest consideration. 
[Signature] 
 
 
 
His Excellency 
Terence Todman, 
Ambassador of the United States of America, 
Buenos Aires, Argentina 
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Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 
 
PART  ONE 
THE INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT OF A STATE 
 
CHAPTER I 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 
Article l 
Responsibility of a State for its internationally wrongful acts 
 
Every internationally wrongful act of a State entails the international responsibility of that State. 
 
Article 2 
Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State 
 
There is an internationally wrongful act of a State when conduct consisting of an action or 
omission: 
 
(a) Is attributable to the State under international law; and 
 
(b) Constitutes a breach of an international obligation of the State. 
 
Article 3 
Characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful 
 
The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international 
law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal 
law. 
 
CHAPTER II 
ATTRIBUTION OF CONDUCT TO A STATE 
 
Article 4 
Conduct of organs of a State 
 
1. The conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law, 
whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever position it 
holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the central Government 
or of a territorial unit of the State. 
 
2. An organ includes any person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law 
of the State. 
Article 5 
Conduct of persons or entities exercising elements 
of governmental authority 
 
The conduct of a person or entity which is not an organ of the State under article 4 but which is 
empowered by the law of that State to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be 
considered an act of the State under international law, provided the person or entity is acting in that 
capacity in the particular instance. 
 
Article 6 
Conduct of organs placed at the disposal of a State 
by another State 
 
The conduct of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an 
act of the former State under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the 
governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed. 
 
Article 7 
Excess of authority or contravention of instructions 
 
The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the 
governmental authority shall be considered an act of the State under international law if the organ, 
person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions. 
 
Article 8 
Conduct directed or controlled by a State 
 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or under the 
direction or control of, that State in carrying out the conduct. 
 
Article 9 
Conduct carried out in the absence or default 
of the official authorities 
 
The conduct of a person or group of persons shall be considered an act of a State under 
international law if the person or group of persons is in fact exercising elements of the governmental 
authority in the absence or default of the official authorities and in circumstances such as to call for the 
exercise of those elements of authority. 
 
Article 10 
Conduct of an insurrectional or other movement 
 
1. The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new Government of a State 
shall be considered an act of that State under international law. 
2. The conduct of a movement, insurrectional or other, which succeeds in establishing a new State 
in part of the territory of a pre-existing State or in a territory under its administration shall be considered 
an act of the new State under international law. 
 
3. This article is without prejudice to the attribution to a State of any conduct, however related to 
that of the movement concerned, which is to be considered an act of that State by virtue of articles 4 
to 9. 
 
Article 11 
Conduct acknowledged and adopted by a State as its own 
 
Conduct which is not attributable to a State under the preceding articles shall nevertheless be 
considered an act of that State under international law if and to the extent that the State acknowledges 
and adopts the conduct in question as its own. 
 
CHAPTER III 
BREACH OF AN INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATION 
 
Article 12 
Existence of a breach of an international obligation 
 
There is a breach of an international obligation by a State when an act of that State is not in 
conformity with what is required of it by that obligation, regardless of its origin or character. 
 
Article 13 
International obligation in force for a State 
 
An act of a State does not constitute a breach of an international obligation unless the State is 
bound by the obligation in question at the time the act occurs. 
 
Article 14 
Extension in time of the breach of an international obligation 
 
1. The breach of an international obligation by an act of a State not having a continuing character 
occurs at the moment when the act is performed, even if its effects continue. 
 
2. The breach of an international obligation by an act of a State having a continuing character 
extends over the entire period during which the act continues and remains not in conformity with the 
international obligation. 
 
3. The breach of an international obligation requiring a State to prevent a given event occurs when 
the event occurs and extends over the entire period during which the event continues and remains not in 
conformity with that obligation. 
 
Article 15 
Breach consisting of a composite act 
 
1. The breach of an international obligation by a State through a series of actions or omissions 
defined in aggregate as wrongful occurs when the action or omission occurs which, taken with the other 
actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful act. 
 
2. In such a case, the breach extends over the entire period starting with the first of the actions or 
omissions of the series and lasts for as long as these actions or omissions are repeated and remain not in 
conformity with the international obligation. 
 
CHAPTER IV 
RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
ACT OF ANOTHER STATE 
 
Article 16 
Aid or assistance in the commission of an 
internationally wrongful act 
 
A State which aids or assists another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by 
the latter is internationally responsible for doing so if: 
 
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and 
 
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
 
Article 17 
Direction and control exercised over the commission 
of an internationally wrongful act 
 
A State which directs and controls another State in the commission of an internationally wrongful 
act by the latter is internationally responsible for that act if: 
 
(a) That State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act; and 
 
(b) The act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that State. 
 
Article 18 
Coercion of another State 
 
A State which coerces another State to commit an act is internationally responsible for that act if: 
 
(a) The act would, but for the coercion, be an internationally wrongful act of the coerced State; and 
 
(b) The coercing State does so with knowledge of the circumstances of the act. 
Article 19 
Effect of this chapter 
 
This chapter is without prejudice to the international responsibility, under other provisions of 
these articles, of the State which commits the act in question, or of any other State. 
 
CHAPTER V 
CIRCUMSTANCES PRECLUDING WRONGFULNESS 
 
Article 20 
Consent 
 
Valid consent by a State to the commission of a given act by another State precludes the 
wrongfulness of that act in relation to the former State to the extent that the act remains within the limits 
of that consent. 
 
Article 21 
Self-defence 
 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State is precluded if the act constitutes a lawful measure of self-
defence taken in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. 
 
Article 22 
Countermeasures in respect of an internationally 
wrongful act 
 
The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation towards 
another State is precluded if and to the extent that the act constitutes a countermeasure taken against the 
latter State in accordance with chapter II of part three. 
 
Article 23 
Force majeure 
 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State is precluded if the act is due to force majeure, that is the occurrence of an irresistible force or of an 
unforeseen event, beyond the control of the State, making it materially impossible in the circumstances 
to perform the obligation. 
 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: 
 
(a) The situation of force majeure is due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the 
conduct of the State invoking it; or 
 
(b) The State has assumed the risk of that situation occurring. 
Article 24 
Distress 
 
1. The wrongfulness of an act of a State not in conformity with an international obligation of that 
State is precluded if the author of the act in question has no other reasonable way, in a situation of 
distress, of saving the author’s life or the lives of other persons entrusted to the author’s care. 
 
2. Paragraph 1 does not apply if: 
 
(a) The situation of distress is due, either alone or in combination with other factors, to the conduct of 
the State invoking it; or 
 
(b) The act in question is likely to create a comparable or greater peril. 
 
Article 25 
Necessity 
 
1. Necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of an act 
not in conformity with an international obligation of that State unless the act: 
 
(a) Is the only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and imminent peril; 
and 
 
(b) Does not seriously impair an essential interest of the State or States towards which the obligation 
exists, or of the international community as a whole. 
 
2. In any case, necessity may not be invoked by a State as a ground for precluding wrongfulness 
if: 
 
(a) The international obligation in question excludes the possibility of invoking necessity; or 
 
(b) The State has contributed to the situation of necessity. 
 
Article 26 
Compliance with peremptory norms 
 
Nothing in this chapter precludes the wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in 
conformity with an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. 
 
Article 27 
Consequences of invoking a circumstance 
precluding wrongfulness 
 
The invocation of a circumstance precluding wrongfulness in accordance with this chapter is 
without prejudice to: 
(a) Compliance with the obligation in question, if and to the extent that the circumstance precluding 
wrongfulness no longer exists; 
 
(b) The question of compensation for any material loss caused by the act in question. 
 
PART TWO 
CONTENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE 
 
CHAPTER I 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES 
 
Article 28 
Legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act 
 
The international responsibility of a State which is entailed by an internationally wrongful act in 
accordance with the provisions of part one involves legal consequences as set out in this part. 
 
Article 29 
Continued duty of performance 
 
The legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act under this part do not affect the 
continued duty of the responsible State to perform the obligation breached. 
 
Article 30 
Cessation and non-repetition 
 
The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obligation: 
 
(a) To cease that act, if it is continuing; 
 
(b) To offer appropriate assurances and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require. 
 
Article 31 
Reparation 
 
1. The responsible State is under an obligation to make full reparation for the injury caused by the 
internationally wrongful act. 
 
2. Injury includes any damage, whether material or moral, caused by the internationally wrongful 
act of a State. 
 
Article 32 
Irrelevance of internal law 
 
The responsible State may not rely on the provisions of its internal law as justification for failure 
to comply with its obligations under this part. 
Article 33 
Scope of international obligations set out in this part 
 
1. The obligations of the responsible State set out in this part may be owed to another State, to 
several States, or to the international community as a whole, depending in particular on the character and 
content of the international obligation and on the circumstances of the breach. 
 
2. This part is without prejudice to any right, arising from the international responsibility of a 
State, which may accrue directly to any person or entity other than a State. 
 
CHAPTER II 
REPARATION FOR INJURY 
 
Article 34 
Forms of reparation 
 
Full reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act shall take the form of 
restitution, compensation and satisfaction, either singly or in combination, in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter. 
 
Article 35 
Restitution 
 
A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make restitution, 
that is, to re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was committed, provided and 
to the extent that restitution: 
 
(a) Is not materially impossible; 
 
(b) Does not involve a burden out of all proportion to the benefit deriving from restitution instead of 
compensation. 
 
Article 36 
Compensation 
 
1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to compensate 
for the damage caused thereby, insofar as such damage is not made good by restitution. 
 
2. The compensation shall cover any financially assessable damage including loss of profits 
insofar as it is established. 
 
Article 37 
Satisfaction 
 
1. The State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to give 
satisfaction for the injury caused by that act insofar as it cannot be made good by restitution or 
compensation. 
 
2. Satisfaction may consist in an acknowledgement of the breach, an expression of regret, a 
formal apology or another appropriate modality. 
 
3. Satisfaction shall not be out of proportion to the injury and may not take a form humiliating to 
the responsible State. 
 
Article 38 
Interest 
 
1. Interest on any principal sum due under this chapter shall be payable when necessary in order 
to ensure full reparation. The interest rate and mode of calculation shall be set so as to achieve that 
result. 
 
2. Interest runs from the date when the principal sum should have been paid until the date the 
obligation to pay is fulfilled. 
 
Article 39 
Contribution to the injury 
 
In the determination of reparation, account shall be taken of the contribution to the injury by 
wilful or negligent action or omission of the injured State or any person or entity in relation to whom 
reparation is sought. 
 
CHAPTER III 
SERIOUS BREACHES OF OBLIGATIONS UNDER PEREMPTORY 
NORMS OF GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
Article 40 
Application of this chapter 
 
1. This chapter applies to the international responsibility which is entailed by a serious breach by 
a State of an obligation arising under a peremptory norm of general international law. 
 
2. A breach of such an obligation is serious if it involves a gross or systematic failure by the 
responsible State to fulfil the obligation. 
 
Article 41 
Particular consequences of a serious breach 
of an obligation under this chapter 
 
1. States shall cooperate to bring to an end through lawful means any serious breach within the 
meaning of article 40. 
 
2. No State shall recognize as lawful a situation created by a serious breach within the meaning of 
article 40, nor render aid or assistance in maintaining that situation. 
 
3. This article is without prejudice to the other consequences referred to in this part and to such 
further consequences that a breach to which this chapter applies may entail under international law. 
 
PART THREE 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE 
 
CHAPTER I 
INVOCATION OF THE RESPONSIBILITY OF A STATE 
 
Article 42 
Invocation of responsibility by an injured State 
 
A State is entitled as an injured State to invoke the responsibility of another State if the obligation 
breached is owed to: 
 
(a) That State individually; or 
 
(b) A group of States including that State, or the international community as a whole, and the breach 
of the obligation: 
 
(i) Specially affects that State; or 
(ii) Is of such a character as radically to change the position of all the other States to which the 
obligation is owed with respect to the further performance of the obligation. 
 
Article 43 
Notice of claim by an injured State 
 
1. An injured State which invokes the responsibility of another State shall give notice of its claim 
to that State. 
 
2. The injured State may specify in particular: 
 
(a) The conduct that the responsible State should take in order to cease the wrongful act, if it is 
continuing; 
 
(b) What form reparation should take in accordance with the provisions of part two. 
 
Article 44 
Admissibility of claims 
 
The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if: 
(a) The claim is not brought in accordance with any applicable rule relating to the nationality of 
claims; 
 
(b) The claim is one to which the rule of exhaustion of local remedies applies and any available and 
effective local remedy has not been exhausted. 
 
Article 45 
Loss of the right to invoke responsibility 
 
The responsibility of a State may not be invoked if: 
 
(a) The injured State has validly waived the claim; 
 
(b) The injured State is to be considered as having, by reason of its conduct, validly acquiesced in the 
lapse of the claim. 
 
Article 46 
Plurality of injured States 
 
Where several States are injured by the same internationally wrongful act, each injured State may 
separately invoke the responsibility of the State which has committed the internationally wrongful act. 
 
Article 47 
Plurality of responsible States 
 
1. Where several States are responsible for the same internationally wrongful act, the 
responsibility of each State may be invoked in relation to that act. 
 
2. Paragraph 1: 
 
(a) Does not permit any injured State to recover, by way of compensation, more than the damage it 
has suffered; 
 
(b) Is without prejudice to any right of recourse against the other responsible States. 
 
Article 48 
Invocation of responsibility by a State other 
than an injured State 
 
1. Any State other than an injured State is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another State in 
accordance with paragraph 2 if: 
 
(a) The obligation breached is owed to a group of States including that State, and is established for 
the protection of a collective interest of the group; or 
 
(b) The obligation breached is owed to the international community as a whole. 
 
2. Any State entitled to invoke responsibility under paragraph 1 may claim from the responsible 
State: 
 
(a) Cessation of the internationally wrongful act, and assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in 
accordance with article 30; and 
 
(b) Performance of the obligation of reparation in accordance with the preceding articles, in the 
interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. 
 
3. The requirements for the invocation of responsibility by an injured State under articles 43, 44 
and 45 apply to an invocation of responsibility by a State entitled to do so under paragraph 1. 
 
CHAPTER II 
COUNTERMEASURES 
 
Article 49 
Object and limits of countermeasures 
 
1. An injured State may only take countermeasures against a State which is responsible for an 
internationally wrongful act in order to induce that State to comply with its obligations under part two. 
 
2. Countermeasures are limited to the non-performance for the time being of international 
obligations of the State taking the measures towards the responsible State. 
 
3. Countermeasures shall, as far as possible, be taken in such a way as to permit the resumption of 
performance of the obligations in question. 
 
Article 50 
Obligations not affected by countermeasures 
 
1. Countermeasures shall not affect: 
 
(a) The obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force as embodied in the Charter of the United 
Nations; 
 
(b) Obligations for the protection of fundamental human rights; 
 
(c) Obligations of a humanitarian character prohibiting reprisals; 
 
(d) Other obligations under peremptory norms of general international law. 
 
2. A State taking countermeasures is not relieved from fulfilling its obligations: 
 
(a) Under any dispute settlement procedure applicable between it and the responsible State; 
 
(b) To respect the inviolability of diplomatic or consular agents, premises, archives and documents. 
 
Article 51 
Proportionality 
 
Countermeasures must be commensurate with the injury suffered, taking into account the gravity 
of the internationally wrongful act and the rights in question. 
 
Article 52 
Conditions relating to resort to countermeasures 
 
1. Before taking countermeasures, an injured State shall: 
 
(a) Call upon the responsible State, in accordance with article 43, to fulfil its obligations under part 
two; 
 
(b) Notify the responsible State of any decision to take countermeasures and offer to negotiate with 
that State. 
 
2. Notwithstanding paragraph 1 (b), the injured State may take such urgent countermeasures as 
are necessary to preserve its rights. 
 
3. Countermeasures may not be taken, and if already taken must be suspended without undue 
delay if: 
 
(a) The internationally wrongful act has ceased; and 
 
(b) The dispute is pending before a court or tribunal which has the authority to make decisions 
binding on the parties. 
 
4. Paragraph 3 does not apply if the responsible State fails to implement the dispute settlement 
procedures in good faith. 
 
Article 53 
Termination of countermeasures 
 
Countermeasures shall be terminated as soon as the responsible State has complied with its 
obligations under part two in relation to the internationally wrongful act. 
 
Article 54 
Measures taken by States other than an injured State 
 
This chapter does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1, to 
invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against that State to ensure cessation 
of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation 
breached. 
PART FOUR 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
 
Article 55 
Lex specialis 
 
These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an 
internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a 
State are governed by special rules of international law. 
 
Article 56 
Questions of State responsibility not regulated 
by these articles 
 
The applicable rules of international law continue to govern questions concerning the 
responsibility of a State for an internationally wrongful act to the extent that they are not regulated by 
these articles. 
 
Article 57 
Responsibility of an international organization 
 
These articles are without prejudice to any question of the responsibility under international law 
of an international organization, or of any State for the conduct of an international organization. 
 
Article 58 
Individual responsibility 
 
These articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under 
international law of any person acting on behalf of a State. 
 
Article 59 
Charter of the United Nations 
 
These articles are without prejudice to the Charter of the United Nations. 
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